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
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# Marine Corps Gazette

JULY 1957  
FORTY CENTS



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# Marine Corps Gazette

JULY 1957

NUMBER 7

VOLUME 41

## IN THIS ISSUE

US IDEALS VS NUCLEAR CONCEPTS	<i>LtCol J. F. Donahoe, Jr.</i>	8
TEN BEST	<i>S. L. A. Marshall</i>	14
TRANSFER THE UNIT	<i>SSgt Dean T. Brown</i>	16
FMF ORGANIZATION AND COMPOSITION BOARD REPORT—		
SERVICE ELEMENTS		20
HOW THE ALLIES LET VICTORY SLIP IN 1944	<i>Capt B. H. Liddell Hart</i>	26
SEABORNE STRIKING FORCE		32
OPERATION MUSKETEER	<i>LtCol Gordon West</i>	34
PLANNING FUTURE MEDICAL SUPPORT	<i>Capt H. A. Johnson, MC USN</i>	42
TITO'S ARMY	<i>Capt Robert B. Asprey</i>	48
THE BRAIN PICKERS OF BARRETT HALL	<i>Maj Dennis D. Nicholson, Jr.</i>	54
MESSAGE CENTER	2	OBSERVATION POST 56
IN BRIEF	40	PASSING IN REVIEW 60



**THIS MONTH AND NEXT** Perhaps the relationship between "the rockets' red glare" on the cover and the 4th of July is stretching a point. Nevertheless, the Terrier Missiles shown being fired at 29 Palms are symbols of our "new Corps." The photograph was obtained through the courtesy of the Convair Division of General Dynamics Corporation.

This issue brings to light several interesting problems. One officer recommends a dynamic change in the possible future employment of the Force-in-Readiness; another reports the results of the 3-dimensional landing at Port Said; a doctor analyzes medical readiness in the FMF; and B. H. Liddell Hart looks at the results of what followed the great-

est amphibious operation in history with a view to learning from that experience. Also, this issue's article on the reorganization of the service elements concludes the series on report of the FMF Organization and Composition Board.

Next month is, of course, the shooters' month and the major theme of the magazine will be dedicated to them—be they the Marine Corps team shots or members of an FMF fire team competing for the new Marine Corps Combat Marksmanship Badges. An article by the former head of the Enlisted Detail Section of HQMC will answer many of the questions most asked by NCOs. A discussion of a new close-support bombing technique, developed by Marine aviators during the closing stage of the Korean war will round out the midsummer issue.

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## MESSAGE CENTER

### The Unhappy Cap

... I have had a poor opinion of our present utility cap for some time, but the final blow was struck by the Army. I visited the 82d Abn Div at Fort Bragg a short time ago and had occasion to wear my utility uniform. The Army officers laughed at my hat, and said, if a soldier wore a hat that looked that bad, he'd be picked up by the MPs. I swore then I might wear it, but I would fight the problem.

I first began to realize the affection and pride a hat can generate in a military organization when I visited Sidi Bel Abbes, the Foreign Legion Headquarters, in 1955. Among the souvenirs made by the Legionnaires were ceramic models of their white cap. I said it was a strange souvenir, and the British Legionnaire acting as guide told me this sea story: In Korea a small Legion Detachment fighting with the French unit was ordered to assault. One grizzled Legionnaire took off his helmet and threw it as far as he could. Placing his white hat on his head at a jaunty angle, he said, "If I die it will be under my Kepi Blanc, not under that tin pot."

Later I had an opportunity to tour the commando training area at Bicklea, England. The Royal Marines took the USS *Des Moines* Marine Detachment

through their course at a walk. At the end of the day I was thoroughly impressed with the rugged realism of their training. They include night cliff assaults from landing boats and free climbing up 250 foot cliffs, etc. The green beret they are allowed to wear after finishing this course has as much



meaning for them as our emblems have for us.

Last summer while on a NELM cruise I saw French paratroopers on liberty in Marseilles swaggering down the street in their camouflage uniforms. I was struck by the realization that they were unmistakably soldiers. I knew they

weren't policemen, postmen, or street car conductors.

I hope the enclosed drawings will aid in calling attention to the need for a hat we can have pride in.

CAPT C. A. BOYD

2d Mar Div, FMF

### With the Rifle Grenadiers

... Would it be possible to put on the M1 rifle an optical sight for grenade firing, similar to the sight used on the 3.5-inch rocket launcher? Such a sight would have to be very rugged, of course, but if a telescopic sight can take the jolting of tank movement, it should be possible to design a simpler lens arrangement capable of absorbing a rifle's kick. The sight would need a reflector, so that the grenadier, in the standard firing position, looking down on his rifle, would see the terrain to his front.


Having such a sight, the rifleman would be much more effective with the Energa and other rifle grenades. With armored strength a characteristic of our potential enemy, the Marine Corps needs to develop every available anti-tank capability.

1st Lt H. P. McLOUGHLIN

Camp Pendleton, Calif.

Ed: The Marine Corps Equipment Board comments follows:

"While the design of such a sight is considered to be feasible, it is doubtful that it would increase the effectiveness of a grenadier firing at enemy armor because of the extremely large vertical and horizontal dispersion characteristics that are inherent to rifle grenades. A sight of this type would have to be overly large and heavy to give it the protection necessary against moisture, fungus,



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
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





**WALTER H. BRATTAIN.** One of three winners of the 1956 Nobel Prize in Physics for investigations on semiconductors and the invention of the Transistor, the tiny device which has created a new electronic era in communications.




**H. F. DODGE.** Awarded Shewhart Medal by American Society for Quality Control, for original contributions to the art of statistical quality control—used by Western Electric in making millions of items of telephone equipment.




**H. T. FRIIS.** Awarded Medal of Honor, Institute of Radio Engineers and Valdemar Poulsen Gold Medal, Danish Academy of Technical Sciences for important work in application of short and ultra-short radio waves.



**AXEL G. JENSEN.** David Sarnoff Gold Medal, Society of Motion Picture and Television Engineers, for technical contributions to television; Hagemann Gold Medal for Industrial Research, Royal Technical College, Copenhagen.




**R. KOMPFFNER.** Awarded Dudell Medal by the Physical Society of England for his original work on the traveling wave tube. This new amplifier makes it possible for long distance microwave highways to carry more telephone conversations and TV programs simultaneously.



**WARREN A. HARRISON.** Awarded the Tompion Gold Medal, Worshipful Company of Clockmakers of the City of London, for pioneer work on quartz crystal oscillators as precision standards of time. This control of electrical vibrations is used to send many voices over the same telephone line.



**W. G. PFANN.** Awarded the Matthewson Gold Medal by the American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers for discovery of and pioneering research in zone melting. This provides the extraordinary purity of silicon and germanium needed in the manufacture of transistors.



**CLAUDE E. SHANNON.** Awarded the Stuart Ballantine Medal by the Franklin Institute for contributions to a comprehensive theory of communication. This greatly illuminates our understanding of how communications systems handle information. It points to new ways to improve service.

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shock and misalignment of optical parts. At the present time a sight for rifle grenades is under development.”

### Old Pig Iron

... Regarding your April article on the removal of the tank battalion from the new Division:

#### The Epilogue of an M-4 Tank

“Well, me and my 1800 buddies have been eased out to pasture with the Force Troops. I knew it was coming for a long time but I just didn't want to think about it. They have always talked about killing me off between wars because I'm a real peace time, landing exercise, headache. I've had some very illustrious titles such as Priest, Grant, Sherman and Patton but I look horrible on paper. I'm so heavy you couldn't lift me with 10 helicopters and I'm a confirmed gasoholic. I bog down real easy and it seems like I was forever deadlined with some ache or pain. The Navy has always had a problem in trying to carry me to war. I remember the year I outgrew their largest landing craft. They were ready to junk me then and they would have too, if there hadn't been a little war going on in Korea. I'm kinda sorry I lost that old high flat-sided M-4 look, although I did look pretty silly over in Europe and Africa when I was fighting those long, low German jobs, but I did a good job. I had a field day over in the Pacific because the Japanese got the modern idea that my kind was too much trouble to haul around. But don't feel too sorry for me, guys. I've had my days. I remember climbing to the top of a lot of hills and there was no one in the whole Marine Corps there for a while except me and some walking Marines. In fact me and those walking Marines got so co-ordinated that we were inseparable until someone looked at the scales and said I was too fat to fly. So you go ahead and put me in my grave and play one short chorus of taps, but don't cover me up. The first time that Greek Thing can't reach 'em I'll come chugging back—that is, if the slope is not too steep.”


LT COL J. R. MUNDAY

San Diego, Calif.

ED: The GAZETTE is not aware that the tank is being buried. It is still an integral part of the FMF.

### Airtransportable

... Have just finished reading the discussion of the proposed organization of the FMF division. Since the end sought appears to be a highly mobile, hard-hitting, airtransportable unit there appears to be a severe deficiency in the equipment assigned to the division (i.e., a fast, armored personnel carrier capable of employment under all weath-



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er conditions and being capable of being air-transported to the battle area).

The wide dispersion of units necessitated by the threat of atomic attack makes the tactics to be employed closely resemble the free-wheeling operations of desert warfare (i.e., draw the enemy to the attack, halt his assault with moderately prepared defensive positions, drive deep into his flank and rear and then break his formations for defeat in detail). Defeat in detail can only be accomplished these days by fast, mobile units capable of maintaining contact with a rapidly withdrawing enemy. The possibility of developing the vehicle to accomplish this tactic can be no more difficult than developing the heavy helicopter. It would be interesting to know whether or not such experimentation has been considered.

CAPT P. D. REISSNER

ED: *The Army has experimented in lifting and dropping all types of armored vehicles (including personnel carriers) and the Marine Corps Equipment Board is in constant liaison with them on the results.*

### Digging Device

... The military art of the shovel and the pick may have altered very little in the course of centuries (*Infantry Dig! Apr GAZETTE*) but much of the actual digging may soon be completed by a machine. The machine, now being tested at Fort Belvoir, Va., can excavate a fox-hole in less than 30 seconds according to an article in the press. The fox-hole offers considerable protection against an atomic munition and considering the requirement for frequent and constant movements in the modern concept, there won't be too much time available for digging. If the machine can do what the article states it can, the Marine Corps might well consider procurement of this time saver. (Hope the machine is airtransportable.)

TSGT R. J. SOUTHALL

HQMC

### Massachusetts Mad On

... Gentlemen, I could overlook your spelling my city name wrong—just someone who didn't know—making up the address plate. But, when I see it spelled wrong on a map on page 52 of the May issue of the GAZETTE—I wonder? There's a saying here in central Massachusetts, which is thrown at people who spell our city's name wrong. It's: *Get the "H" out of Worcester.* Thanks.

MSGT BEN G. OMAN, JR.

Worcester, Mass.

ED: *The GAZETTE Art Director, a native son of Massachusetts, assures the citizens of Worcester that the "H" is permanently out.*

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# U. S. IDEALS VS. NUCLEAR CONCEPTS

By

**LtCol J. F. Donahoe, Jr.**

RECENTLY, THERE HAS BEEN EVIDENCE of the beginnings of another "great debate" in relation to national defense. Such debates are no novelty, but rather a healthy aspect of the form of government that relies upon the public forum instead of the secret chamber in shaping the affairs of state. In the area of national defense, for example, the years of 1946 and 1947 witnessed the unification debate which culminated in the National Security Act that, with subsequent modifications, gave us the present Department of Defense. The public press dubbed a 1949 defense debate the "Revolt of the Admirals" and called one in the spring of 1956 the "Revolt of the Colonels." Shortly thereafter, a Senate sub-committee investigated the adequacy of Defense Department planning and procurement in development of the Strategic Air Command.

Indications are that new debate may be centered on even more basic




concepts than those of size, roles and missions which have been the previous focal points, but that elements of each previous debate will be present. A new concept is reported under discussion which contemplates replacing men with the instruments of war to the extent that over-all armed forces strength may be reduced as much as 25 per cent by 1960. It is linked to the present capability for massive retaliation embodied in the SAC's B-52, and it envisions the obsolescence of this formidable weapon as the ICBM becomes a reality. It further assumes that withdrawal of US troops from foreign lands will be accelerated as other more efficient atomic and thermonuclear weapons become operational.

Along with weapons progress, the development of nuclear power has been demonstrated by the nuclear powered submarine *Nautilus* in steaming 50,000 miles without refueling. If that is possible, how would nuclear power plants change the operational capability of surface craft—both combatant and logistic? Propulsion should be equally effective and, therefore, a far more mobile fleet could be evolved as dependence upon the supply train is lessened, if not eliminated. The concept of the fast carrier striking force is enhanced in direct proportion to its increase in mobility—the ideal for which such a force strives.

Naturally, the employment of nuclear weapons by all of these delivery systems (B-52, ICBM and carrier forces) is to be inferred. So also is (with greater aircraft and guided missile ranges and the greater fleet mobility) a withdrawal of US forces to "Fortress America"—one name given to this proposal.







The "Fortress America" idea has appeared in various forms during the years of US development as a world power. It has found favor because the basic sympathies of a large segment of our population have traditionally been isolationist. For example, President Woodrow Wilson learned this as he attempted to find support for US participation in the League of Nations after WW I, only to be repudiated by the Congress. (Certain historians point to this withdrawal as a significant contribution to the beginnings of WW II.) And, both the late Senator Robert Taft and ex-President Herbert Hoover again recommended such a move as recently as 1952.

With the new ranges and greater mobility, it might well be argued we do not become isolationists by retracting our forces into a "Fortress America." We can move rapidly and retaliate massively with weapons and at a time and place of our own choosing. Militarily, the concept of "Fortress America" is sound. It permits concentration of forces mainly within the continental US, and such concentration is militarily far more desirable than "piecemeal" deployment in a ring of containment surrounding the Communist world. Too, this concentration has as its corollary "economy of force," and a significant reduction in size becomes feasible. Thus, the published features of the "Fortress America" concept. In this concept, each NATO nation becomes responsible for its own defense and the present US forces on the ground will be re-

placed by the nation's own troops. Our great nuclear power becomes their main support.

While this may be *militarily* sound, there are certain blind spots in such a concept. It is held that modern war (and the present "cold war" is evidence) is not only military, but also diplomatic, psychological and economic in nature. In fact, military action is usually withheld until the other phases have been fully exploited. The co-ordinated employment of the non-military phases with the threat, or use, of military power of a nation is termed national strategy. National strategy supports national policy. National policy is the guideline for courses of action to attain ends that further a nation's own best interests.

The question becomes, therefore, in the present world situation, is the US military evacuation of NATO nations under consideration sound from the standpoints of national policy and national strategy, including possible military action?

*Unless modified, or unless unpublicized features are present, the answer is: "No!"*

It is the intent, here, to present conditions under which such a proposal, somewhat modified, might be sound; and, in broad terms, to discuss methods for implementation, using modern technology to the utmost, *yet still keeping faith with the ideals of western civilization.* It is basic to these suggestions that our national policy must foster and enhance these western ideals because their world-wide acceptance is in

our own best interests.

Turn back the clock to WWII. A world watched Hitler, in quest of *Lebensraum*, expand Germany into a vast European Nazi state through bloodless conquest until he attacked Poland. France and England declared war, but it was called a "phony war" because they did not have the capability to interfere with Hitler's plan. After Poland was conquered, Hitler occupied Norway, then turned west and south; France and the Low Countries fell; the British got out by the skin of their teeth from Dunkirk and 4 years were needed to prepare the mightiest war machine the world had ever seen to reclaim the nations that had thus been lost. Hitler's success, militarily, has been credited, on one hand, to his audacity and the effectiveness of a completely rebuilt war machine; and, on the other hand, to his realization that effective co-operation would not exist among the threatened nations and that piecemeal aggrandizement of territory would be possible. In short, he employed force and the threat of force boldly in a succession of military vacuums and nearly achieved his objective.

Today the potential enemy is not Hitler, but Russia. Whether we call it "cold war" or "competitive co-existence" we are in a struggle (bloodless, at present) with Russia. This struggle is one between two great groups of nations with the widest possible divergence in cultures and ideals. Our economic supremacy and our national re-

**A military capability for nuclear warfare alone jeopardizes the ideals it is designed to protect.**

**We must exploit the mobility of the balanced fleet with its inherent landing elements**

sources have thrust upon us the leadership of the Western nations—nations that, in general, believe in the ideals expressed in our own Constitution; in the inherent dignity of the individual human. His rights to build a better life and to be governed by a government of his own choice are parts of this dignity. Facing us is a culture based upon the supremacy of the state, where too many witnesses can give only silent testimony to its ruthlessness.

If we retract from NATO foot-holds into a "Fortress America"—which maintains its strength only from nuclear potential—what will happen to these Western nations who are our philosophical and psychological allies in the "cold war?"

If we promise to support them with atomic or thermonuclear weapons in the event of war, do we not limit ourselves to only one possible course of action?

And what would be the overt act that would commit this support?

Where and when would be the time and place of our choosing?

Assume that all NATO forces except a newly constituted West German Army are withdrawn from Germany. Could this (proposed) 12 division, 500,000-man army withstand an invasion by East German forces? Assume that the East Germans would use only "conventional" non-atomic weapons and that their forces would be augmented by Russian volunteers, just as the NKPA found aid from CCF volunteers in Korea. How soon would a "United Germany" disappear behind the "Iron Curtain?" What of our commitments to support and retaliate?

How? . . . Nuclear? . . . Where?

Particularly in West Germany, such an attack would also cause heavy casualties among our psychological allies. How long would they remain allies?

The Russian homeland itself? Thus giving Russia the opportunity to show the world that we are the imperialistic war mongers that Moscow has said we were—and worse, that we have rained death and destruction upon a "helpless people?" The "day of infamy" that was Pearl Harbor would fade into insignificance in the propaganda onslaught alone if we followed such a course. Where would the sympathy of

Nehru's India and the "neutrals" of the world lie as a result?

And, with group "purges" and individual political eliminations or "suicides" as witness to the Russian disregard for human dignity and rights, what restraint would exist to prevent their pursuit of action calculated to invite our only capability—nuclear action? To them, it might be expedient and, in the past, expediency has been the only yardstick used in measurement of means to their ends.

Even further, the use of nuclear or atomic weapons should be carefully scrutinized on two major and related issues: the moral and the practical.

The practical: Just as we have known "counterbattery" in the past, the logical development, once the first atomic weapon is employed, will be "atomic counterbattery" in ascending caliber until both sides have passed the range of atomic cannon or tactical guided missiles. Then, high performance aircraft assume the mission. In turn, we are led to the ultimate employment of strategic aircraft with thermonuclear weapons. Serious scientists, speaking in complete objectivity, have said that when that starts "this world will have had it!"

The moral: The Western ideal of individual human dignity has its moral and ethical roots in Judean-Christian culture and traditions. Under this culture, use of force in self defense against an aggressor is justifiable if a clear and present danger exists and is recognized; but the force to be employed is limited to that sufficient to subdue the aggressor; license is not granted to employ force overwhelming in proportion to that of the aggressor. (As a simple, pre-atomic example, in the "winning of the west" as we learned it on Saturday afternoons in our local Bijous, it was not enough that the "bad guy" was armed. He had

to draw before Tom Mix, Tim McCoy, Buck Jones and the rest of the "good guys" could go for their guns. The evil capability of the "bad guy" was not enough—his intention had to show clearly. And, always, it seemed, the "good guys" had weapons of only the same or lesser caliber.)

Before Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the A-bomb was an uncertain weapon, and deliberations in serious counsel resolved it to be usable. Now, the uncertainty of A and H bombs has been eliminated. Can we then use such weapons first—that is, can we use them first and still pretend national and strategic policies consonant with the morality and ideals which those policies supposedly further? Naturally, should an enemy use them first, we should have no qualms, moral or otherwise, in using them in retaliation. Our previous practical experience with counterbattery techniques probably justifies the immediate retaliation with H bombs to enemy use of tactical atomic hand grenades, if there are such things, for we must anticipate and prevent his counterbattery reactions once "the weapons" are employed. Further, his full capability has become a recognizable intention through his entry into nuclear action.

Returning to our hypothetical case, would not retraction from Germany and reliance upon nuclear weapons alone create the same sort of military power vacuum that Hitler exploited? A vacuum inviting entrance. Then, would our dilemma be: massive retaliation or none?

Our decision could throw us into a moral and psychological abyss that would cost us our ultimate objective as the price of military victory. There are still groups of philosophical and psychological allies on the other side of the Iron Curtain. The East Berlin riots in 1953, the June 1956 demonstrations in Poznan and

**LtCol Donahoe**, just finishing a tour with the NROTC at Holy Cross, is enroute to Senior School. He wrote: "I was prompted to write this because I personally believe that Russia would have liked to provoke atomic action by the UN forces in Korea in order that she could have propagandized the entire Oriental world with the accusation that the US would use nuclear weapons against only Asians (i.e., as against Japan in WWII). From that it was only one step to the hypothesis of how they could exploit similar US nuclear action in Europe, and thence to what alternatives to nuclear war should we consider? To me, the moral and ideological considerations are paramount, and nuclear war must be viewed in the light of what those considerations dictate."

the recent Hungarian uprising have shown us that. But, would Poznans and Budapests of tomorrow rise once nuclear weapons have been employed? There is a significant difference between nuclear and non-nuclear war. It could be the difference between the rioter who now says: "I shall risk death to resist the Russian tank with sticks and stones so that my family and descendants can be free of this yoke!" and the one who *would not say*: "Though my wife and children will perish in the holocaust that follows, I will still resist the Russians!"

Ruling out, except in retaliation, the nuclear weapons, what about the use of conventional weapons in the restoration of West Germany? If the East Germans have been successful in consolidating all of West Germany, and "de facto" recognition is granted by any nation, or full recognition is granted by Russia, do we not have a situation analogous to Korea and the inviolability of the Yalu boundary? Or, recalling the 4 years of preparation between Dunkirk and the Normandy beaches, is that the course to which we would commit ourselves. Such a prospect would invite additional moves into similar vacuums while we prepared, and time would act to the Russian advantage.

But there is an alternative. One that would use modern technology to the maximum advantage, retain the deterrent threat against nuclear or conventional warfare, support allies in a manner consistent with our national ideals, and still permit reduction in our armed forces.

The West German hypothesis continues; however, the general outline should be valid in any critical area. West Germany builds up armed forces for her own defense to the point that meets treaty requirements and that she can financially bear. As she builds, the US withdraws until no "foreign forces" are on German soil. In effect, Germany becomes a Western nations' strong point, a fixed position to be held at all costs, and an outpost guarding approaches to "Fortress America." But fixed positions, tactically speaking, are unsound without mutual support and observation from other fixed positions. Strategically, the same generalities apply. Strategic



**Nuclear power can untie the fleet from a complex supply system**

lines of communication are the equivalent of tactical patrol routes. We *can* withdraw our ground forces from Europe—if we can return in good order and in sufficient time to support those positions which must be held. We must keep our lines of communication (patrol routes) open.

The advent of nuclear power can significantly untie the fleet, combatant and transport, from a complex logistical resupply system. Much as the Sixth Fleet now operates in the Mediterranean, another fleet could range the Atlantic, the Channel and the North Sea—from Gibraltar to Norway—as our mobile patrol force. It would be a fleet capable of swift striking action from its fast carrier components, one which contains its own air defense and antisubmarine elements, and, in addition, one which contains the *Thetis Bay*-type CVHAs and transport elements essential to the lift of a 3-division amphibious corps. The concept of NATO would change. "Fortress America" would become the base from which this huge mobile patrol operates. Opening of hostilities would signal the initiation of a 3-phase counteroperation:

Phase I—"Delay" phase. Nation attacked trades space for time in order to assure success of Phase II. Tactical air support from the US fleet available.

Phase II—"Blunting" phase. Seaborne US amphibious corps joins nationals to reduce impetus of attack to zero. Joint forces establish force beach head line to permit build up for Phase III.


Phase III—Counteroffensive phase. US and allies mass and attack to re-

store boundaries.

In Phase I, the mission of each NATO nation would be to delay, deceive and disorganize (the classic outpost mission) and to force full deployment of the invader. Should an invasion commence, our powerful fleet, using pre-arranged code plans, and already seaborne, would move to the theater of operations. National army retirement plans would be based primarily upon consolidating and telescoping their perimeter into a littoral where a natural force beach head line exists. Fleet air support would be available during this phase. The optimum result, assuming enemy superiority that forces retirement, is that the retirement would be deliberate enough to permit unopposed landing of US forces for Phase II. Short of this optimum, the "new concept" US Marine helicopter assault forces would move directly to the planned and predetermined FBHL to cover the withdrawal of the NATO ally's forces. Having withdrawn within the FBHL perimeter, they would strengthen and consolidate this FBHL to be held "at all costs." The area encompassed would permit administrative landings of forces sufficient to mount a counteroffensive to repulse the invader without the necessity for an amphibious assault. (Considering economy alone, it would be absurd to compare the ease and rapidity with which forces may land upon friendly ground to the problems involved in an amphibious assault against enemy held territory.)

Without an exhaustive analysis of all intelligence factors affecting each





***The Helicopter Assault Forces—a primary element in US power . . .***

possible theater, the proposal of a 3-division amphibious corps as the required force is obviously suspect. It is not the purpose here to deal in such specifics. However, on the critical D-day in Normandy, SHAEF put ashore 8 divisions in an opposed landing. Thus, the immediate commitment of an intact amphibious corps and the addition of retiring national forces in organization of the FBHL would appear to approximate the strength sufficient to accomplish the Phase II objective of blunting the attack and setting the stage for Phase III. Phase III would, in this hypothetical case, take place much as the "Breakout from St. Lo" occurred when sufficient strength had been massed.

At this point, close examination must be made of the weapons intended for use of this mobile force. The assumption that has been incorporated into the US Marine Corps "new concept" of vertical envelopments and extremely mobile helicopter assault forces is that tactical atomic weapons will be in the hands of the troops. Realizing that such assumptions and concepts are not developed without greatly detailed studies, analyses and evaluations, the question remains: Must we not guard against letting that assumption become so accepted in

our thinking that we neglect development of methods for waging "conventional" warfare? Admittedly, it would require unheard of unanimity of national opinion to allow US forces to withhold any weapon available if American lives are being lost in efforts to aid any ally. Yet, if a situation such as this should occur, a world, half-free and half-slave, will be watching! If the enemy uses nuclear weapons first, naturally, retaliate. But until then we must hold hope alive in the slave world for relief from that oppression which denies human dignity and creates a slave responsible to the state. Tomorrow's Budapests hold the hope that human dignity can be regained—not that they and their children, if they survive, will be reduced to slobbering sub-humans grubbing for existence in a devastation brought about by their yearnings for freedom. And the presently Free World, if we can withhold the nuclear weapons, will have visible evidence that we practice what we preach. Thus we would strengthen the moral fibers that bind it with us.

The most modern conventional weapons, coupled with modern technology applied to transportation and other logistic problems, will permit significant reductions in the size of our Armed Forces. A seaborne force

would have that mobility that would allow us to halve requirements for US forces landlocked in one nation or another. The capability of moving a corps into either France or Germany would relieve us of the requirement of keeping a corps in each.

Moreover, in time-space factors, helicopter assault forces and other elements of this mobile amphibious corps would be no further away from the theater of operations than the potential enemy. Thus, the deterrent effect of a "force-in-being" would not be lost, and in fact, the type of deterrent that did not exist before the Korean action would be present.

The diplomatic/psychological effect of a ready US force would act to the best interests of the US by bolstering the national morale of its allies while eliminating the allegedly detrimental effect upon diplomatic relations of permanently based US forces in foreign lands. The "thorn in the side" would be removed. As the defense plans were developed in each nation, CPXs and full scale rehearsals of the Phase II part of each code plan (joint amphibious force—national army establishment of the FBHL) could be conducted. This might call for a 15-day exercise followed by 7 days of critique. US units during this period would gain the psychological effect often referred to as "showing the flag," but the reaction of the populace toward them would be more as it is to tourists or "visiting firemen," than as to the "men who came to dinner." (Present evidence is that the American tourist has been a most welcome visitor in these lands.) US personnel permanently stationed in NATO nations would be reduced to essential liaison groups working with various nations' field commands and perhaps some US exchange students in the military/naval schools of each country.

This is ambitious thinking, but we do have the prototype command in the Sixth Fleet. Through its operation, we have gained invaluable experience in making such a concept possible.

Conversion or new construction of combatant and transport fleet elements with nuclear propulsion will be costly. The development of

this mobile force must naturally be adjusted to our economic capacity. It would serve nothing if we bankrupt ourselves in our efforts. But it can be phased with troop withdrawal so that the sum of our immediate capability for NATO action remains constant. A vacuum, no matter how temporary, *must* be avoided.

The exact composition of the floating mobile force in strength and weapons would be subject to close scrutiny. It would need both conventional and nuclear capability. The guided missiles, artillery and other new weapons in various stages of development will use both nuclear and non-nuclear warheads, so the warhead used will not unduly affect the training of troops.


The percentage of the force actually at sea or engaged in the proposed CPXs and rehearsals and that which is US based, but poised and ready for immediate movement to the threatened area, may vary. Adverse indications would obviously put a greater force to sea. As tensions relax, the seaborne force could be diminished, but its units so disposed at stations and bases that the capability exists for *immediate* assembly and movement to augment the mobile force. A "moth-balled" fleet requiring 30 days' preparation, or under-strength troop units with material shortages or training deficiencies would not have this *immediate* capability.

Training and plans for employment of this mobile force must respect enemy nuclear capability; primarily in regard to fleet and troop dispersion, evasive action and defense against attack and must retain the capability for immediate tactical retaliation. Invariably, our post WW II training exercises have assumed that enemy capability.

The landing force mission will be to hold, at all costs, the terrain necessary to insure administrative landing of the forces required for Phase III—restoration of previously existing boundaries.

Present roles and missions of the Armed Forces appear to remain valid. Keeping the sea lanes open has always been a naval responsibility. They are open if we can unobtrusively bring forces ashore in Europe.

The Marine Corps responsibilities for development of tactics, tech-



niques and equipment to be employed by landing forces and for the organization of Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms would continue. Revisions in force composition would occur as new organizations and new tactical concepts are made possible by new weapons; nevertheless, operational readiness would be at a constant peak of efficiency because of previous Navy-Marine Corps experiences in years of "balanced fleet" development.

The Army responsibility for sustained land operations naturally indicates its mission in the main effort of Phase III. In Phase II, the defended terrain would include both ports for seaborne delivery of Phase III forces and air fields permitting their airborne arrival.

The Air Force's SAC deterrent threat would be most persuasive in keeping the war "localized" and non-nuclear. Its Tactical Air Command would support the Phase III counter-offensive.

In summary: in our own best interests we cannot permit the existence of military power vacuums among our allies that would invite aggression by Russia or its satellites. We can prevent such vacuums and still reduce the required number of troops if we will *exploit to the fullest the mobility and staying power of a*

*powerful fleet*—a modern, balanced fleet, relieved of many logistic problems by nuclear propulsion, and a fleet whose landing elements, in themselves, also possess the ultimate degree of mobility.

Further, through an adherence to ethical and moral principles in the selection of armament and weapons for that fleet, backed by the practical deterrent force of a nuclear weapon SAC, we can, if war comes, attempt to keep the war localized. We can stand firm in the defense of the Free World and still let the conduct of operations bear witness to the principles for which we stand, and for which we are willing to fight. Our ultimate end in conflict is not merely military victory. Military action is but another means employed when efforts short of war have failed to serve our own best interests. Our aim is to serve our best interests by making the world realize that national ideals which respect human dignity are practical and attainable. That aim is what our national policy and national strategy, including military action, must support. A military capability for *nuclear warfare alone* does not adequately render that support because it jeopardizes—even invites compromise of—the ideals it is designed to protect.

USMC

the

# TEN BEST

## Books with which to begin a professional library

S. L. A. Marshall

✱ OVER ALMOST 40 YEARS MY OWN MILITARY READING has been spotty and unsystematized. I have read more for enjoyment than for information. In screening and collecting a military library which now numbers not more than 2,750 volumes, I have read and thrown away at least 7,000 volumes. Some of them may have been better books than the ones I saved but they were not for me. It is my habit to mark books, to underline passages which stir my imagination and to make marginal notations where a thought is expressed which sharpens or amplifies my own point of view and should have future reference value. This is a mean way to treat books, but when one's livelihood comes partly of working with military ideas, it is the best way to preserve a thought, short of a cross-indexing system. When I read a book that at no point moves me to mark its passages, it is discarded. Most of what remains is well-thumbed for I find it profitable to read the same books over and over.

Saying which reminds me that as to military literature, what one reads, whether for relaxation or to further his education, is largely a matter of taste. There are many diverse routes to the same main end — the study of the nature of man as a fighting animal and how his force is most efficiently joined with others to give successful battle. Justice Holmes said that the proper song for a soldier is a war cry. The proper and fundamental field of search for all who would learn more about command is the human nature of troops. That was what Napoleon was really trying to say when he conjured those who would perfect themselves in the art to study the campaigns of the Great Captains.

For reasons that I do not myself understand, I have found that certain military writers, for example Maurice de Saxe among the ancients, and Gen J. F. C. Fuller among the moderns, actively stimulate me to agreement or disagreement. The act of disagreeing is often a lead to the doing of original work. There are other classicists, for example, Clausewitz and Jomini, whose writings are for me a waste of time. They're good for somebody, but somebody else, not me. The Mexicans have a saying: *Voy Mas Ami*, or "I go more to myself." That more or less applies. I go to writers who extend and complement the little that I have rather than to writers who, sedulously studied, might give me a new dimension. Fuller, who is a great strategist, tactician and theorist of movement — perhaps the greatest of our century — fired my curiosity about the nature of man in war, which is my field of main interest. Ardant du Picq, who wrote more pro-

foundly and passionately on this subject than any modern authority, I have yet to read.

With books, one man's fish is another's fowl. What others think makes no difference so long as a book is important to me. Discharged after World War I, I was trudging home with \$1.75 in my pocket. In a book store window I saw a book by von Bernhardi, *On Future War*. Figuring I might as well be broke as the way I was, I paid \$1.50 for it. Later I paid \$1 for John Masefield's *Gallipoli*. These 2 volumes started my military shelf. It matters little now that critics say Bernhardi's book was a brainstorm and Masefield's was a beautiful pipedream about a harsh reality. I treasure them both.

Now as to the list of 10 recommended books, I could as well put forward 80 or 100, for I cannot honestly say that a particular 10 have meant more to me than the others. It is for that reason that I do not mention such classics as de Saxe's *Reveries* or U. S. Grant's *Memoirs*, the clearest and best-informed piece of military writing by any American soldier. The list is narrowed to 10 which have been particularly cherished by me and should appeal to any fighting man seriously interested in his trade.

*Prelude to Victory*, by BrigGen Edward Spear, which I believe to be the clearest and most thrilling all-level view of a big battle to be found in the English language.

*The Outpost of the Lost*, by BrigGen David Brainard; the most profound study I know of the problems of maintaining discipline and morale under inordinate stress.

*Roving Commission* by Winston S. Churchill, a master hand writing about the excitement and hardship of campaigning. *The Desert War*, by the same author for the same reason.

*The Lorraine Campaign*, by Hugh M. Cole, one of the Army Historical series. This book is a landmark, made so by the skill with which operations on both sides of the hill are developed in perfect balance.

*The Forgotten Peace*, by John Wheeler Bennett, an oblique study of Gen Max Hoffmann's 1918 campaign into South Russia and an eye-opening revelation of the methods of Communist negotiation at Brest-Litovsk. Too bad we were not warned by it.

*The Science of War*, by Col G. F. R. Henderson. It is all old stuff now, but his dissertations on tactics, strategy and human nature under stress are models.

*The Generalship of U. S. Grant*, by J. F. C. Fuller. One genius looks at another and analyzes his growth in command responsibility.

*Topography and Strategy in the War*, by Douglas W. Johnson, the best analysis I know of the influence of geography over operations.


*The Call to Honour*, by Gen Charles de Gaulle, for sheer beauty of expression and clarity of military thought, one of the great memoirs of all time.

*The Death of Hitler's Germany*, by Georges Blond, a masterpiece of condensation, with due emphasis on the dramatic and significant, so that sound history becomes a breath-taking story.

The list ends because the man said 10. It is enough good reading to supply 4 lost weekends. US MC



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# Transfer the UNIT

By SSgt Dean T. Brown



❖ ALL BUT A FEW LONELY PERSONS will admit that victory in battle is finally achieved by the man who is on the ground and able to hold that ground. Even in a modern atomic war final victory will depend on the basic abilities of the foot soldier. Any tendency to ignore the basic abilities of the infantryman as an individual would endanger the final outcome on any battleground.

Atomic war cannot as yet guarantee 100 per cent destruction of enemy soldiers. Therefore, a single infantryman cannot stand on the ground and proclaim victory. A unit of troops is needed. The extent of the battlefield will determine the size of the unit necessary for control of victory. Atomic war merely indicates a reduction in the necessary size of the controlling unit.

There is no tendency to ignore the training of individuals in the Marine Corps. It is still policy that everyone who wears the Anchor and Globe is a basic Marine above all else. A unit is needed, however, and a group of the world's finest infantrymen does not necessarily make a unit. It takes time to weld the individuals together so that they are indeed united. This is not a failure of

the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps never fails. But it does appear to be a weak point in our Corps.

Members of the "Old Corps" say the Marine Corps has grown too big, too unwieldy to be efficient. History says "No." In WWII when the Marine Corps grew to its greatest strength in numbers, it attained its most glorious victories. Individually, relatively few persons in this war were outstanding. Yet the glories of each unit are told again and again.

During this war the Marines came up with a new formation. At the very beginning of the war the 2d Raider Bn experimented with and tested the fire team. They finally took it to battle and proved it. This same fire team could be the small unit of control that modern atomic war indicates as desirable in future wars, though a squad would seem more reasonable in our thinking just now.

With this fire team came the time when envelopment from the flank and even double envelopments became the first thought of commanders. Companies, platoons and even an occasional squad worked them.

Today the envelopment is still the first thought of most unit commanders.

However, envelopments are not just a maneuver you order to happen. Properly executed they call for a division of your force. Unless it is done at the proper time with the proper speed and efficiency, this division of force can result in disaster to your own command. Envelopments don't just happen.


Yet in that war they worked wonderfully, and victories were won by them.

The 2d Raider Bn made an even more familiar contribution to the posterity of the Marine Corps. Every Marine hears of it almost every day. The newest "Boot" drops it with the intimate familiarity of the combat veteran. The private hurls it derisively at the voice of authority. "Gung Ho," the battle cry of the 2d Raiders, has become a password. The key to all manner of things in the Corps of today.

It has become so familiar that people argue and write letters to the editor about its meaning.

Gung Ho is the missing element in today's envelopments. Gung Ho is the difference between victory and defeat. When the 2d Raiders screamed "Gung Ho!" it was more than just a battle cry. It was what

Atomic war has pushed the small unit to the front—  
training and teamwork make it essential to keep the unit together



they believed in and worked for. They meant, and they were, "working together"—as one.

Somewhere along the line, Gung Ho and double envelopment were separated. The meaning of Gung Ho was lost and with it went the secret of all envelopments.

Today, when atomic war has forced the small unit to the fore as the ideal and necessary formation, every advantage a small unit can get is vitally needed. It is imperative that we regain the spirit and the ability to work together. In other words, "We must rededicate ourselves to the task that lies ahead."

We seem to have found a small, but important, element that is missing from the present concept of training in today's Marine Corps as contrasted with the victorious Corps of the past. Granted, that the sound of angry shots has, in the past, always lighted the fuze that eventually burned to that explosion of faith that has carried our Corps to victory. Question: will there be time, between the holocaust of an atomic explosion and the destruction of what we stand for, for this fuze to burn its normal course and ensure our victory? I submit, we cannot risk that that fuze will burn fast enough. We must define this missing element clearly and devise a means of incorporating it permanently in our training structure.

All men will have some additional

word they want added to the definition we seek—for it is of moral fiber, a thing of the spirit, an attitude. It is "esprit de corps" expanded to a way of life—and death. Fine words, you say, for so small a thing. Yet I tell you that all the fine words of our language could not do justice to the idea we would isolate for inspection. Like all moral attitudes, it will spring from a small seed planted and nurtured by time.

In our instance this seed appears to be in the nature of pride. It takes time to create pride.

Here again in this formula we seek we run into time. Two portions of time. Time to create our seed and time to feed that seed to maturity. Yes, time would seem to be our enemy, for we face also the lack of time between that first bomb and the loss of our way of freedom. So perhaps if we examine our use of time we may find a solution to our problem. If we are able to make time into an ally we may also create the spirit we seek.

Every unit commander has watched impatiently as time passed in the training of his troops. The first phase when everything was wrong. Each succeeding phase of training passing with fewer mistakes until, almost as a miracle, his unit begin to click. It did in fact become a team. It wasn't easy. This process of welding a team can never be easy. Each time the plan was laid out and


run through, the veteran troops griped more loudly and the recruits cried more shrilly. Then just as it seemed that the limit of endurance had been reached, this distasteful din faded, the clicking began and the magnificent sweep of controlled units began to appear. The griping and crying had changed to a spark of pride.

Here, by physical and mental trial and error, we have attained the very beginning of the spirit we seek. Here, if we have time to care for the seed we have planted, the benefits of our training can begin to come to the fore. By husbanding this tiny spark we can build a blaze in which the first fire team becomes better than the second fire team in the thoughts of the members of that team. The squad becomes the best in the platoon, the platoon the outstanding platoon of the company, and the company grows to be the best damned company in the whole Marine Corps. So the spark grows and feeds on itself until a raging, all consuming conflagration encompasses all foes. Success and victory will follow.

Too often the spark is never quite reached or, if attained, it is permitted to die. Time is wasted. The monotonous and painful process is begun anew.

Usually this is brought about by the end of a tour of duty. Transfer of parts of the team. A breaking up and scattering of the members of the brotherhood which was so newly formed. The basic unit we spent so many hours to perfect is discarded by some higher authority which has decreed that any individual man

#### HONORABLE MENTION GROUP III







**SSgt Brown** went to Boot Camp on 1 Jan '42. Thereafter he joined the 2d Raider Bn. Following the deactivation of the Raiders he became a rifleman in the 26th Marines, 5th Mar Div and was wounded on Iwo. Leaving the Corps after the war, he returned in Jan '54. In writing this article Sgt Brown stated, "I believe that the ideas brought into the open offer hope of progress. The thoughts of many, developed by a few able men, form worthy policy. Being neither in a proper position to voice ideas on policy, nor a professional writer, I chose this method of presenting one rough idea. . . . During the 8 years I was a civilian I learned the truth of the statement 'Once a Marine, always a Marine.'"

will stay at one post just so long, and then he will drop everything and move to a new post.

This is one point in our problem that we can study and improve. No doubt there are many reasons for this ruling about transfers. It provides variety in training conditions, living conditions, duties and even climates. The good things and the bad things are spread around to everyone. It prevents stagnation in the individual Marine. No doubt there are many reasons which the average Marine such as I will never know or understand. No doubt in the long run it is a most beneficial policy. It does appear, however, that a very slight modification could be made that could both continue that policy and improve on it. At the same time this modification would eliminate most of the loss of unit training which we have been sacrificing.

This modification is minor and easy to outline. Simply stated, it is to do away with the individual transfer and to substitute for it some system of unit transfers.

The larger the unit that can be transferred at the end of a tour of duty, the less the loss in training the parent unit will suffer. So, we think first of the ultimate, the ideal. In this we find our nation divided into areas by population and each area becoming the home of one of our regiments. The adjoining areas would form a home for one of our divisions. While most units of the divisions are serving overseas, one battalion would be stationed in the home area manning the posts of the Corps in that area. When time for transfers come with the end of tours of duty, another well trained battalion of the home division goes to the

home area to assume the duties there and an organized unit, the battalion it relieved, rejoins its parent organization in the field for the purpose of sharpening its combat readiness. In this instance, even the Reserve units would be, at least on paper, a part of the area unit. They would furnish well trained replacements to the parent organization and would in turn accept well trained discharges from that parent unit into their organization of Reserves.

This kind of unit life would take years of organization and conversion to achieve. The end benefits could be outstanding.

We set our sights high in that first instance, but knock off a few clicks of elevation and consider transfers on the company level. How comforting it would be for some harried Naval officer commanding a Naval base to have his precious Marine Guard replaced in one movement by a competent, well trained unit complete with an operating headquarters. How grateful the townspeople would be to receive well disciplined groups of buddies in place of the usual heterogeneous mass of troublesome troops on liberty nights. How fine for the regiment in the field to receive, as a replacement for its prize company, an organization that was ready to maintain the regiment's overall level of efficiency without tedious training.

What happens if we must fire at minimum range in this problem? Transfer on a squad level. The essence of successful infantry tactics lies in the abilities of the separate squads that compose the unit involved. Too much emphasis cannot be allotted the importance of the squad. Here is where loyalty is

formed. Here is where danger is met and conquered without medals. The squad is the family unit of our Corps wherein the men live for and with each other. In an efficient squad each member must know the thoughts and the reactions of every other member of that squad in every situation that may arise whether it arises in combat or on liberty. Good squads are a creation of command. They should be fitted together with the exactness of a machined tool. Squads cannot be made with the old "alphabetically by rank" system. Why then should they be destroyed without just reason? Finally, is transfer a just reason? This answer is obvious. Squad transfer would be easy to accomplish both administratively and physically. I believe it would simplify many more problems than it could possibly complicate. Thus, squad transfer is a target we cannot miss; nor could we lose by attempting it as a test of the larger theory.

This modification of policy could also bring an important gain in the attack on the twin perennial problems of re-enlistment and recruiting. It could provide a tremendous boost to our Reserve program. Happy and efficient units re-enlist and spread the gospel of the Corps, thereby creating a "desire to belong" in the minds of the type of men we need. "Once a Marine, always a Marine" would gain new and added truth. Those men who were forced to leave active duty would be unable to divorce themselves completely from our Service and so would join our Reserve units without special urging.

In summation, we find that by employing this modification to present policy we can save valuable time in our training program. We find that time, instead of being an enemy, is now working for us, maybe not yet as our ally but at least as our prisoner, adding with each hour to the creation of the esprit de corps that has become such a very necessary part of every true Marine.

I do not claim that unit transfer is a complete and final solution to our problem. I have only indicated an idea. Minds of men trained in management can pull this hazy sketch apart and reassemble it in a pattern useful to the Marine Corps. I do feel that it is important enough to merit consideration. USMC



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# FMF ORGANIZATION AND COMPOSITION BOARD REPORT SERVICE ELEMENTS

## THE FOURTH AND FINAL PART OF A SERIES

THE RECENTLY COMPLETED REPORT OF THE MARINE Corps Organization and Composition Board recommended major changes in the service organization in the Fleet Marine Force. This article, one of a series, describes those changes and gives some of the background considerations as to why they were recommended.

The concentrations of supply and service installation characteristics of World War II and the Korean War are totally out of the question in modern warfare. The modern doctrine places a premium on speed, shock and surprise. This presupposes that optimum flexibility and a high order of tactical and strategic mobility must be present in the Fleet Marine Force. Service elements are inherently the heaviest, the least mobile, and least flexible of all units. How then, can they be organized to increase their mobility and flexibility and at the same time give them the capability to provide the required support? It is very easy to speak in terms of greater mobility, flexibility—widely separated installations. How to accomplish this is an entirely different matter. In the final analysis the extent of the service support required is a function of the character and size of the force supported, the scope and extent of its operations and the area in and the conditions under which it is operating. The board then had a series of problems to solve. What total service capability should be within the framework of the Fleet Marine Force structure? What should be the organizational arrangement of this capability and finally the specific organization of the individual units?

The Board recognized that the Marine Corps is in a period of transition between conventional operations and those envisioned under the modern doctrine. This means there is a necessity for retaining, for the time being, certain of the battle-tested structure, weapons and equipment of the past. There is at the same time a necessity for selective modification of organization, weapons and other equipment in keeping with the requirements of modern warfare. As a force-in-readiness, the organization and composition of the Fleet Marine Force must at any given time be consistent with and effectively utilize material available during the period under consideration. It must at the same time be such as to allow for the orderly and efficient transition as new equipment becomes available.

The foregoing were factors which influenced the board's thinking with respect to tactical as well as service organizations.

Strange as it may seem, there are not many different ways in which service elements can be organized. In the past they have generally been organized along functional lines, i.e., supply, maintenance service, motor transport, shore party, engineer, medical, etc. At higher levels supply, maintenance and certain service elements have been grouped together in a larger organization. At this level the supply and maintenance functions have usually been further grouped into the technical categories of ordnance, general supply, communication-electronics, engineer and motor transport. Where possible we have separated motor transport and engineer operating functions, from the supply and maintenance function. This organizational approach is reflected in our current Service Regiment in the division as well as in the Combat Service Group at Force level. The board found no particular quarrel with this functional type organization. However, certain flexibility is lost by resorting to the use of technical categories as a means of organization, particularly at division level. It is difficult to establish a task organization to support a specific tactical plan with our current Division Service Regiment. The same is true with respect to our Combat Service Group.

From a further analysis of our current service organization, it is apparent that several major differences exist. First, too great a burden for logistic support has been placed on and in the division. Second, there are too many echelons in the support chain (battalion, regiment, division, force, depot). Third, our present service support organizations are far too heavy, lack mobility and the necessary flexibility to support widely developed tactical units. Fourth, we do not have an adequate Force-level organization capable of supporting a division/wing task force.

As a desirable goal the Board was interested in cutting down on support overhead in all areas in order to obtain the maximum combat power with a minimum investment in manpower and material. In this connection, certain basic determinations were made. These are:

- 1) To concentrate the principal service support for air units at group and wing level, with certain support



common to ground and air at Force level.

2) To concentrate the principal service support for ground elements at division and Force level.

3) To develop or adopt a Force-level organization capable of supporting both air and ground elements for all common supply, service and maintenance functions.

4) To eliminate the regimental echelon in the logistic support chain, at the same time making organic to battalion-size units that service support necessary to effect internal distribution and organizational first and second echelon maintenance.

5) To remove from the division those service support capabilities not habitually required in combat. To combine and rearrange service functions within the division, in order to reduce overhead, eliminate weight and bulk and provide a more flexible and mobile organization.

In developing the service support organization within the division, the following were used as guidelines in addition to the general criteria for the division as a whole. These general criteria were outlined earlier in an article on the Marine division.

1) The division should have an organic service support organization to provide minimum requirements for initial assault operations.

2) Additional support to sustain operations for a short period of time.

3) The organization must be to the extent practical as mobile and flexible as the tactical unit which they are to support.

4) They must contain sufficient organizational flexibility to facilitate optimum combination of various elements in support of a wide variety of tactical missions.

5) The organization must reduce to a minimum its vulnerability to atomic attack.

6) Should reduce administrative and own organic support overhead in all possible areas.

7) Must have a command structure capable of planning, controlling and executing the logistic support mission.

## DIVISION SERVICE ELEMENTS

The division service organization was developed from the above guidelines and the other considerations given earlier. The principal changes involved the present Division Service Regt, Shore Party Bn and Engineer Bn. Certain minor changes were made in Medical and Motor Transport.

## SERVICE BATTALION

The present Division Service Regt has been redesignated as a Service Bn. It has been reorganized to provide for a more flexible employment in support of tactical operations. The present division shore party function has been incorporated in this battalion.


The Service Bn has been organized to provide centralized logistic support to all division units or to provide companies or detachments for support of detached elements of the division.

The battalion consists of H&S Co, 3 Light Support Companies, a Medium Support Company and 2 Landing Support Companies. It is a considerably smaller organization than the present Service Regt and Shore Party Bn which it replaces. Its total strength is approximately 74 officers and 1,402 enlisted men.

The H&S Co provides for command, administrative and organic supply functions for the battalion.

The Light Support Companies are designed to provide light supply and maintenance support to tactical elements of the division. It will normally operate in the forward portion of the beach support area in support of a regimental landing team. It may be either attached to or placed in support of tactical elements. Except for 10 2½-ton cargo trucks in the motor transport section, it is helicopter transportable. Its internal organization is company headquarters, a maintenance platoon and a supply platoon. The amount of supplies it mans will be limited to those required to support current tactical operations on a day to day basis. It does not establish large dumps or maintenance installations and should maintain a mobility equal to the tactical element it supports. The company has been struc-

### Service Battalion, Marine Division



tured to provide minimum essential combat type support and requires back-up reinforcement for sustained operations.

The Medium Support Company (22 officers and 364 enlisted men) consists of a company headquarters, 2 maintenance platoons and 2 supply platoons. This company is designed to provide general support to the division as a whole.

It has the capability of operating 2 balanced and widely separated supply and maintenance installations and carries the bulk of the Class II supplies of the division. It will normally operate in the rear portion of the beach support area establishing installations which can receive and distribute supplies and equipment to all elements of the division. It is a heavier unit and provides back-up support to the Light Support Companies. It is capable of limited third echelon maintenance. It does not have a Class I, III, or V capability. The automatic supply distribution of the Force Service Regt establishes these installations in direct support of the division.

The 2 Landing Support Companies (7 officers and 168 enlisted each) consists of a company headquarters and 3 landing support platoons. These companies are designed to operate in the beach support area, preparing, marking and controlling landing areas and assisting in the rapid landing and dispersed supplies to inland installations. It co-ordinates evacuation of casualties. It will normally operate on the beach or in helicopter landing zones in direct support of assault elements of the division. The platoon is the basic unit for operation of one landing beach or helicopter landing zone. The company has organic the necessary communication personnel and equipment to establish essential internal and external communication necessary in accomplishing its mission. A minimum of heavy equipment required for beach operations is organic to the company.

To many, this new Service Bn may look far too small for support of the division. It must be viewed, however, in the light of the division as a whole and what support is to be provided by Force. The new division organization requires less in the way of service support. It has fewer vehicles to be maintained. The introduction of mortars as close support artillery and the elimination of tanks in the division reduces the ordnance maintenance problems. The reduction in personnel in the division also reduces its logistic requirement. The logistic capability of the Service Bn includes only those services habitually required by the division to initiate and sustain combat for a 15-20 day period. Extended operations ashore will require augmentation or support from Force service elements. We will see later that the Force logistic support capability has been increased appreciably.

### PIONEER BATTALION


The Engineer Bn was redesignated a Pioneer Bn. This title was considered more appropriate to its assigned functions and provided a better distinction between this unit and our Force Engineer Bn.

The Pioneer Bn is designed to provide both tactical and logistical type support. It is organized into a H&S Co, a Pioneer Support Co and 3 Pioneer Companies. The strength of the battalion is 35 officers and 796 enlisted.

The H&S Co provides command, administrative and organic supply functions for the battalion. In addition it performs field maintenance (limited third echelon for engineer material of the division).

The Pioneer Support Co consists of a company headquarters, a construction platoon, a bridge platoon, an equipment platoon and a motor transport platoon. It is capable of accomplishing those essential support functions in the rear areas of the division. It can also augment the capabilities of the pioneer companies as

#### *Pioneer Battalion*



required.

The Pioneer Co consists of a company headquarters and 3 pioneer platoons. These companies will normally provide light pioneer support for an RLT. They will operate in the forward area.

### MEDICAL BATTALION

The principal change in the Medical Bn has been the deletion of the 2 Hospital Companies which were formerly organic and the addition of one Collecting and Clearing Company. The medical supply function has been removed and placed in the Service Bn. The hospital companies were deleted from the division in the interest of increasing the mobility of the medical units. The availability of the helicopter for rapid evacuation to higher echelon medical installations and the increasing use of transport aircraft in casualty evacuation were other factors which led to the conclusion that a hospitalization capability organic to the division was no longer required.

The battalion now consists of an H&S Co and 4 Collecting and Clearing Cos.

The H&S Co, in addition to providing the command, administrative and organic supply functions for the battalion, has 2 surgical teams for use in reinforcing the Collecting and Clearing Cos as required.

The Collecting and Clearing Cos are organized into a company headquarters, a collecting platoon and a clearing platoon. Its primary mission is to provide for the collection and clearing of casualties of supported units and their evacuation, i.e., helicopter or surface means to rear area or afloat medical installations. One company will normally function in support of each RLT and the fourth company provides medical support for other division elements.

### MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION


The Motor Transport Bn is organized essentially the same as the "L" Series battalion except that one truck company has been removed. The size of the H&S Co was reduced to reflect the support of one less company. With the increase in helicopter capability, the Board considered that a corresponding reduction in ground transport organic to the division could be effected at this time.

### FORCE SERVICE ELEMENTS

The Board recommended no changes in the internal organization of the following units:

- Force Engineer Battalion
- Fixed and Floating Bridge Companies
- Explosive Ordnance Disposal Company
- Topographic Company
- Motor Transport Battalion
- Separate Surgical Companies
- Hospital Companies
- Dental Companies

The major changes in Force service units was for a new organization to replace the present Combat Service Group and the organization of a Mass Evacuation Company. The Board did make certain recommendations about the number of various units to be organized, but that is beyond the scope of this article.



### Medical Battalion

### FORCE SERVICE REGIMENT


This organization has been under study and development at Headquarters Marine Corps prior to convening the Board. From a review and analysis it appeared that it met the general criteria and contained the requisite capabilities for a Force-level service unit. The Board recommended the adoption of this unit.

It is designed to provide supply, maintenance and essential services to a Marine division wing task force as well as a number of Force Troops units. It takes the place of the present Combat Service Group.

It is organized into a H&S Bn, an Automatic Supply Distribution Bn and a Material Supply and Maintenance Bn. It is a large organization and at full strength has 160 officers and 3,700 enlisted.

It is envisioned that the Force Service Regt will be employed as the supply link between depot and fleet logistic agencies and the landing force elements deployed in the objective area. In the execution of this function those elements of the regiment which supply high usage items such as rations, water, ammunition and fuel may be landed early in an operation or even with the assault elements. Other supply elements are eche-

### Motor Transport Battalion





loned into the objective areas as required. The maintenance elements of the regiment may be deployed in the objective area or at bases outside the objective area.

Specifically the Force Service Regt can:

1) Furnish to supported units as required, logistic services to include bakery, graves registration, laundry, salvage, air delivery and freight forwarding.

2) Furnish balanced detachments for simultaneous sustained logistic support in combat up to two separated elements of a task force each of RLT/MAG sizes requiring independent logistic support.

3) Until such responsibility is assumed by higher echelon, co-ordinate for the commander with other services as required in obtaining or furnishing logistic support through cross-servicing and develop cross-servicing procedures for the task force.

4) Requisition, storage and issue to supported units all classes of supply.

5) Maintenance of prescribed stock levels of all classes of supply to include mounting out stocks of fourth echelon spares for all supported units and third echelon spares as required for support of Force Troops.

6) Provision of fourth echelon field maintenance are third echelon back-up for supported units.

7) When adequately augmented by attachment of additional service troops, it assures full responsibility for Force-level logistic support of units in the objective area.

8) Requisition, storage and distribution to supported units of classes I, II, III, IV and V.

9) Receipt, handling, storage and distribution to supported units of class III A and V A. Distribution will extend directly to airfield installations, but does not include base internal storage and distribution functions.

10) Within its capabilities, provision of such assistance as may be required in the receipt, storage handling and movement of classes II A and IV A to supported air units.

11) Provide all echelons of field maintenance of Marine Corps furnished equipment beyond the capabilities of the support air units.

The H&S Bn has the primary mission of providing command, administration, communication, transportation and supporting services for the requirement. It is organized into an H&S Co, a Communication Support Co., a Longshoreman Co and a Shipping and Receiving Co.

The Automatic Supply Distribution Bn provides all functions incident to the supply of classes I, II, II A, V and V A. It is organized into a Hq Co, an Ammunition Co, a Bulk Fuel Co and a Ration Co.

It is envisioned that this battalion will form the nucleus of the assault echelon of the Force Service Regiment. It will assume at an early stage in the operation responsibility for operating class I, III, III A, V and V A installations. It has the capability of operating a minimum of two widely separated installations in support of assault units.

The Material Supply and Maintenance Bn consists of an H&S Co, 5 Maintenance Cos (Electronics, Engineer, MT, Ordnance and General Supply) and a Supply Co. Its primary mission is to perform all functions incident to receipt, storage, issue and field maintenance through fourth echelon of Marine Corps furnished class II and IV for elements of the task force. In operation of limited duration this organization need not be deployed into the objective area. It can operate at an adjacent or nearby base and be echeloned into the objective area when and if required.

### MASS EVACUATION COMPANY

There are many ideas as to what should be done in handling the mass casualty problem. The Board believes that there should be in each Fleet Marine Force an organization capable of providing the minimum essential means to solve this problem. The organization developed was designated a Mass Evacuation Co. It consists of a headquarters platoon, a monitoring and decontamination platoon, a transportation platoon, and a medical platoon. This company will be a Force-level unit. It provides the commander with an organization that can be quickly moved into an area which has been subjected to atomic attack. It has the necessary personnel to control and direct operations at the site of the atomic blast and a minimum of medical, monitoring and decontamination personnel to perform essential tasks. The transportation platoon provides the necessary personnel for directing, dispatching and controlling the various transportation means that may be assigned for evacuation of injured personnel. It is anticipated that this unit will be the focal point for rescue operations. Additional medical, damage control and rescue teams and other personnel will be used to reinforce this organization as required. USMC

### ★ ★ ★ ★ Adjust, Slings!

IN THE SPRING of 1942 a battalion from Marine Corps Schools, was one of those battalions to be sent to Washington, DC to participate as an escort for the remains of the late Gen John A. Lejeune.

Maj Asa Smith was the commander of the battalion with which I had to march.

The word was changed quite frequently as to how we would proceed to the railroad station at Quantico. The formation was changed back and forth; the method of carrying the rifles was changed several times.

Finally an exasperated Maj Smith received the last word — rifles would be carried at sling arms. The battalion was called to attention and the command was given, "Sling, Arms!"

A young second lieutenant, fresh from the Reserve Officers' School and commanding his first formation of company size, stepped forward of the line of company commanders, saluted and inquired in a loud voice: "Sir, is that the loop or the hasty sling?"


The exasperated answer was: "Lieutenant, we're gonna wear 'em — not shoot 'em!"

Capt J. E. Forde, Jr.

(The GAZETTE will pay \$10.00 for each anecdote published. Submissions should be short and pointed.)

*New Cessna YH-41 delivers top performance*

*plus big maintenance savings to helicopter flying!*




Cessna's all-new YH-41, recently purchased by the U. S. Army for its air arm, combines the latest in design and engineering advances to give operating and maintenance performance never before experienced in the helicopter field!

For example, the engine—mounted in the nose of the fuselage—makes installation and servicing easy—provides extra cargo or passenger space. Cessna has made the rotor assembly aerodynamically clean. Also, the drive system on the new YH-41 is a masterpiece of simplicity, has a minimum of parts—conveniently located for easy servicing.

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CESSNA AIRCRAFT CO., WICHITA, KANSAS



By Capt B. H. Liddell Hart

# HOW THE ALLIES LET VICTORY SLIP IN 1944

✱ THE WAR COULD EASILY HAVE been ended in September 1944. The bulk of the German forces in the West had been thrown into the Normandy battle, and kept there by Hitler's "no withdrawal" orders until they collapsed—and a large part were trapped. The fragments were incapable of further resistance for the time being, and their retreat—largely on foot—was soon outstripped by the British and American mechanized columns. When the Allies approached the German border at the beginning of September, after a sweeping drive from Nor-

mandy, there was no organized resistance to stop them driving on—into the heart of Germany.

I explored this question immediately after the war, questioning the German generals principally concerned. Gen Blumentritt, who was Chief of Staff in the West, summed up the situation in a sentence: "There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open."

On 3 September one spearhead of the British Second Army, the Guards Armored Div, swept into Brussels—after a 75-mile drive through Bel-

gium from its morning starting point in northern France. Next day the 11th Armored Div, which had raced level with it, drove on to Antwerp and captured the vast docks undamaged before the surprised German base units there had a chance to carry out any demolitions.

That same day the spearheads of the US First Army captured Namur, on the Meuse.

Four days earlier, on 31 August, the spearheads of Patton's American Third Army had crossed the Meuse at Verdun, a hundred miles to the south. Next day, patrols had pushed



## Did the Allied Command properly assess the extent of the German collapse?

on unopposed to the Moselle near Metz, 35 miles further east. There they were barely 30 miles from the great industrial area of the Saar on the German frontier, and less than 100 miles from the Rhine. But the main bodies could not immediately follow up this advance to the Moselle as they had run out of fuel, and did not move up to the river until 5 September.

By that time the enemy had scraped up 5 weak divisions, very scantily equipped with antitank guns, to hold the Moselle against the 6 strong American divisions that were spearheading Patton's thrust.

Meanwhile the British had arrived in Antwerp — which, also, was less than 100 miles from the Rhine, at the point of entry into the Ruhr, Germany's greatest industrial area. If the Ruhr was captured Hitler could not maintain the war.

On this flank there was now an immensely wide gap — 100 miles wide — facing the British. No German forces were yet at hand to fill it. Rarely in any war has there been such an opportunity.

When the news of this emergency reached Hitler, in his far distant headquarters on the Russian front, he put through a telephone call on the afternoon of 4 September to Gen Student, the Chief of the parachute troops, who was in Berlin. Student was ordered to take charge of the open flank, from Antwerp to Maastricht, and form a line along the Albert Canal with such garrison troops as could be scraped up from Holland, while rushing there the scattered parachute units that were under training in various parts of Germany. These were alerted, mobilized, and entrained as quickly as possible. The newly formed units only received their arms after reaching the de-training stations, and were then immediately marched up to the battleline. But the whole of these parachute troops only amounted to about 18,000 men — hardly the equivalent of one Allied division.

This collection of oddments was named the "First Parachute Army," a high-sounding title that covered a multitude of deficiencies. Policemen, sailors, convalescent sick and

wounded, as well as boys of sixteen, were hauled into help fill the thin ranks. Weapons were very short. Moreover the Albert Canal had not been prepared for defense on the northern bank; there were no fortifications, strong points or trenches.

When I questioned Gen Student, he said: "The sudden penetration of the British tank forces into Antwerp took the Fuehrer's Headquarters entirely by surprise. At that moment we had no disposable reserves worth mentioning either on the Western Front or in our own country. When I took over command of the German right flank on the Albert Canal I had one coast-defense division from Holland, besides recruit and invalid units. The latter had been formed into an 'invalid division,' with battalions composed of men grouped according to their physical defects — 'stomach-battalions' for men suffering from duodenal ulcers, 'ear-battalions' etc. They were reinforced by a panzer detachment of merely 25 armored fighting vehicles — tanks and self-propelled guns."

At that time, as the captured records reveal, the Germans had barely 100 tanks available for action on the whole Western Front, against more than 2,000 in the Allies' spearheads. The Germans had only 570 serviceable aircraft to support them, whereas the British and American aircraft then operating in the West totalled over 14,000. Thus the Allies had an effective superiority of 20 to 1 in tanks and 25 to 1 in aircraft.

But just as complete victory appeared within easy reach, the Allies' onrush petered out. During the next two weeks, up to 17 September, they made very little further progress.


The British spearhead, after a pause to "refit, refuel and rest," resumed its advance on the 7th, and soon secured a crossing over the Albert Canal, east of Antwerp. But in the days that followed it only pushed 18 miles further — to the Meuse-Escaut Canal. That short stretch of swampy heath country was interspersed with small streams, and the German parachutists, fighting with desperate courage, put up a resistance out of all proportion to their slight numbers.

The First US Army came up level with the British, but pushed no deeper. The major part of it ran into the fortified belt and coalmining area around the city of Aachen — which lies in, and obstructs, this historically famous "gateway" into Germany. There the Americans became entangled, and bogged down, while wider opportunities slipped away. For when they reached the German frontier the 80-mile stretch between the Aachen area and the Metz area was covered by a mere 8 enemy battalions, strung out across the hilly and wooded country of the Ardennes. The Germans had most effectively used this rough stretch for their surprise armored thrust into France in 1940. By taking what appeared to be the easier paths into Germany the Allies met greater difficulties.


That was seen in the south as well as in the north. For Patton's Third Army began to cross the Moselle as early as 5 September, yet was little further forward 2 weeks later — or, indeed, 2 months later. It became stuck in its attack on the fortified city of Metz and nearby points — where the Germans had at the outset concentrated more than anywhere else.

By mid-September the Germans had thickened up their defense all along the front, and above all on the most northerly sector, leading to the Ruhr — where the gap had been greatest. That was the more unfortunate since Montgomery was now mounting another big thrust there, to the Rhine at Arnhem, on 17 September. In this he was planning to drop the recently formed First Allied Airborne Army to clear the path for the British Second Army.

This thrust was checked by the enemy before it reached its goal, and a large part of the British 1st Abn Div, which had been dropped at Arnhem, was there cut off and compelled to surrender. The next month was spent by the US First Army in grinding down the defenses of Aachen, while Montgomery brought up the First Canadian Army to clear out the 2 "pockets" of Germans — on the coast east of Bruges and on Walcheren Island — which com-



**Montgomery's Plan**



**Eisenhower's Plan**

manded the passage up the Scheldt estuary to Antwerp, and thus blocked the use of the port. Clearing these pockets proved a painfully slow process, which was not completed until early in November.

Meanwhile the German build-up along the front covering the Rhine was progressing faster than that of the Allies, despite Germany's inferiority in material resources. In mid-November a general offensive was launched by all 6 Allied armies on the Western Front. It brought disappointingly small gains, at heavy cost. Only in the extreme south, in Alsace, did the Allies reach the Rhine, and that was of little importance. In the north they were still left nearly 30 miles distant from the stretch of the river covering the vital area of the Ruhr. It was not gained until the spring of 1945.

The price that the Allied armies paid for the missed opportunity in early September was very heavy. Out of three quarters of a million casualties which they suffered, in liberating Western Europe, half a million were after their September check. The cost to the world was much worse—millions of men and women died as a result of that extension of the war. Moreover, in September the Russian tide had not yet penetrated into Central Europe.

What were the causes of a missed opportunity so catastrophic in its consequences? The British have blamed the Americans, and the Americans have blamed the British. In the middle of August an argument had begun between them as to

the course which the Allied armies should pursue after crossing the Seine.

With the swelling stream of reinforcements the Allied forces in Normandy had been divided on 1 August into two army groups, each of two armies. The Twenty-first Army Group, under Montgomery, retained only the British and Canadians, while the Americans formed the Twelfth Army Group, under Omar Bradley. But Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander, arranged that Montgomery should continue in operational control and "tactical co-ordination" of both army groups until Eisenhower moved his own headquarters over to the Continent and took over direct control—which he did on 1 September. The interim arrangement, hazily defined and delicate, was prompted by Eisenhower's spirit of conciliation and consideration for Montgomery's feelings, as well as his appreciation of the latter's greater experience. But the well-meaning compromise resulted in friction, as so often happens.

On 17 August Montgomery had suggested to Bradley that "after crossing the Seine, Twelfth and Twenty-first Army Groups should keep together as a solid mass of 40 divisions, which would be so strong that it need fear nothing. These forces should advance *northwards*" to Antwerp and Aachen, "*with their right flank on the Ardennes.*"

The wording of this proposal tends to show that Montgomery had not yet realized the extent of the enemy's collapse, or the difficulty of

keeping up supplies to such a "solid mass"—unless it went forward at a slow pace.

Meantime Bradley had been discussing with Patton the idea of an *eastward* thrust past the Saar to the Rhine south of Frankfurt. Bradley wanted this to be the main thrust, using both the American armies along this line. This meant reducing the northward thrust to a secondary role, and naturally did not appeal to Montgomery. Moreover, it would not lead directly to the Ruhr.

Eisenhower was now in the uncomfortable position of being the rope in a tug of war between his chief executives. On 22 August he considered the differing proposals and next day had a discussion with Montgomery, who urged the importance of concentrating "on one thrust," and devoting the bulk of the supplies to it. That would mean halting Patton's eastward thrust, just as it was going at top speed. Eisenhower tried to point out the political difficulties. "The American public would never stand for it." The British had not yet reached the Lower Seine, whereas Patton's eastward thrust was already over a hundred miles beyond them, and less than 200 miles from the Rhine.

Faced with these conflicting arguments, Eisenhower sought an agreeable solution in a compromise. Montgomery's northward thrust into Belgium should be given priority for the moment, and the American First Army was to advance north along with the British to cover and aid their right flank as Montgomery



required, in order to ensure the success of his advance. Meantime the bulk of the available supplies and transport should be used to maintain this northern thrust, at the expense of Patton's. But once Antwerp was gained, the Allied armies were to revert to the pre-invasion plan of advancing to the Rhine "on a broad front both north and south of the Ardennes."

None of Eisenhower's executives liked the compromise but their complaints were not so loud at the moment as they became in later months, and years, when each felt that he had been deprived of victory in consequence of that decision. Patton called it "the most momentous error of the war."

On Eisenhower's orders, Patton's Third Army was restricted to 2,000 tons of supplies a day, while 5,000 tons were given to Hodges' First Army. Bradley says that Patton came "bellowing like a bull" to his headquarters, and roared "To hell with Hodges and Monty. We'll win your goddam war if you'll keep Third Army going."

Unwilling to submit to the limitations of supply, Patton told his leading corps to drive on as long as it had any fuel left, "and then get out and walk." The advance reached the Meuse before the tanks ran dry, on 31 August. On the previous day Patton's army had received only 32,000 gallons of fuel instead of its current daily requirement of 400,000, and was told that it would not get any more until 3 September. Meeting Eisenhower at Chartres on the 2d, Patton burst out: "My men can eat their belts, but my tanks have gotta have gas."

After the capture of Antwerp on 4 September, Patton was again given an equal share in supplies with the First Army, for his eastward drive to the Rhine. But he now met much stiffer enemy resistance, and was soon checked on the Moselle. That caused him to complain all the more violently of the way he had been cut short of fuel, for the benefit of Montgomery's thrust, in the crucial last week of August. He felt that "Ike" had put harmony before strategy and sacrificed the best chance of early victory in his desire to appease "Monty's insatiable appetite."

On the other hand, Montgomery

regarded Eisenhower's idea of a "broad front" advance to the Rhine as basically wrong, and was opposed to any diversion of supplies to Patton's diverging eastward thrust while the issue of his own northward thrust hung in the balance. His complaints became stronger, naturally, after his thrust to Arnhem had fallen short and failed to fulfill his hopes. He felt that Patton's pull with Bradley, and Bradley's with Eisenhower, had been decisive in the tug of war and spoilt the prospects of his own plan.

It is easy to understand Montgomery's disapproval of any effort which made no direct contribution to his own. On the surface there is such obvious justification for his complaint about Eisenhower's decision to resume a 2-prong thrust that most British commentators on the war have come to accept it as the main cause through which victory was forfeited. But in closer examination it becomes evident that the effect was relatively small.

For, in fact, Patton received an average of only 2,500 tons of supplies a day during the first half of September—a mere 500 tons more than during the days when his army was halted. That excess was a trifling amount compared with the total daily allotment to the armies engaged in the northern thrust during the crucial period, and barely enough to maintain one additional division. So we must probe deeper for the real causes of failure.

One significant discovery is that a heavy handicap came from a plan to drop large airborne forces near Tournai, on the Belgian frontier south of Brussels, to aid in the northward thrust. The ground forces arrived there before the drop was due to take place, on 3 September, and it was accordingly cancelled. But the withdrawal of air transport in preparation for it caused a 6-day suspension of air supply to the advancing armies that cost them 5,000 tons of supplies. In gasoline that would have been equivalent to one and a half million gallons—enough to have carried two armies to the Rhine without pausing, while the enemy were still in chaos.

The responsibility for this superfluous airborne plan, so costly in ef-



Wide World



*The part played by personalities has often been the subject of speculation. To what extent did Montgomery's influence on Eisenhower offset the pleas of Patton and Bradley?*

Wide World



Wide World





fect, is not easy to determine. Curiously, both Eisenhower and Montgomery claim the parentage in their post-war accounts. Eisenhower says: "It appeared to me that a fine chance for launching a profitable airborne attack was developing in the Brussels area, and though there was divided opinion on the wisdom of withdrawing planes from supply work . . . I decided to take the chance." But Montgomery says: "I had plans ready for an airborne drop in the Tournai area" and refers to it as "my idea." In contrast Bradley says: "I pleaded with Ike to discard the scheme and leave us the aircraft for supply. . . . 'We'll be there before you can pull it, I warned.'" That proved true.

Another important discovery is that a large proportion of the supply tonnage for the northward thrust was devoted to the replenishment of ammunition that was not needed, so long as the enemy were in a state of collapse, instead of concentrating on maintaining the supply of gasoline needed to keep up the pursuit and allow the enemy no chance of rallying.

A third discovery is that the flow of supplies to Montgomery's thrust was seriously reduced at the crucial time because 1,400 British-built 3-ton lorries, and all the replacements for this model, were found to have faulty pistons. If these lorries could have been used, a further 800 tons of supplies could have been delivered daily to the Second Army—sufficient to maintain 2 more divisions.

A fourth point, of still wider significance, is the great handicap caused by the lavishness of the British and American scales of supply. The Allied planning was based on the calculation that 700 tons of supplies a day would be consumed by each division, of which about 520 tons a day would be required in the forward area. The Germans were far more economical, their scale of supply being only about 200 tons a day for a division. Yet they had to reckon with constant interference from the air, and from guerrillas—two serious complications from which the Allies were free.

The self-imposed handicap that the Allies suffered from their extravagant scale of supply was increased

by the wastefulness of their troops. One glaring example was over jerrycans (5-gallon fuel cans) which were so important in refuelling. Out of 17½ million cans which were sent to France since the landing, in June, only 2½ million could be traced that autumn!

Another big factor in the failure of the northern thrust was the way that the US First Army became stuck in the fortified and coalmining web around Aachen—a strategic "entanglement" which virtually became a vast "internment camp," as Salomika had been for the Allies in World War I. In analysis it becomes evident that the abortiveness of the US First Army's thrust—to which nearly three quarters of the American supply tonnage was devoted, at Patton's cost—arose from Montgomery's demand that the bulk of this army should be used north of the Ardennes to cover his right flank. The space between his own line of advance and the Ardennes was so narrow that the US First Army had little room for maneuver or chance of by-passing Aachen.

That badly entangled army was unable to give Montgomery any help in the next phase, too, when he launched his mid-September drive for Arnhem. But here the British also paid forfeit for an extraordinary oversight. When the 11th Armored Div raced into Antwerp on 4 September it had captured the docks intact, but made no effort to secure the bridges over the Albert Canal, in the suburbs, and these were blown up by the time a crossing was attempted 2 days later—the division then being switched eastwards. The division commander had not thought of seizing the bridges immediately when he occupied the city, and no one above had thought of giving him orders to do so. It was a multiple lapse—by 4 commanders, from Montgomery downwards, who were usually both vigorous and careful about important detail.

Moreover, barely 20 miles north of Antwerp is the exit from the Beveland Peninsula, a bottleneck only a few hundred yards wide. During the second and third weeks of September the remains of the German Fifteenth Army, which had been cut off on the Channel coast, were allowed to slip away north-

wards. They were then ferried across the mouth of the Scheldt and escaped through the Beveland bottleneck. Three of the divisions arrived in time to strengthen the enemy's desperately thin front in Holland before Montgomery launched his drive for the Rhine at Arnhem, and helped to check it.

What in the other side's view would have been the Allies' best course? When I interrogated Blumentritt he endorsed Montgomery's argument for a concentrated thrust in the north to break through to the Ruhr, and thence to Berlin, saying: "He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a breakthrough, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians." Blumentritt considered that the Allied forces had been too widely and evenly spread. He was particularly critical of the attack towards Metz: "A direct attack on Metz was unnecessary. The Metz fortress area could have been masked. A swerve northward to Luxembourg would have caused the collapse of the right flank of our First Army followed by the collapse of the Seventh Army, which would have been cut off entire before it could retreat behind the Rhine."

Gen Westphal, who on 5 September replaced Blumentritt as Chief of Staff on the Western Front, took the view that the choice of the thrust-point was, in the circumstances, less important than a concentrated effort to drive home any thrust. "The overall situation in the West was serious in the extreme. A heavy defeat anywhere along the front, which was so full of gaps that it did not deserve this name, might lead to catastrophe if the enemy were to exploit his opportunity skilfully. A particular source of danger was that not a single bridge over the Rhine had been prepared for demolition, an omission which took weeks to repair. Until the middle of October the enemy could have broken through at any point he liked with ease, and would then have been able to cross the Rhine and thrust deep into Germany almost unhindered."

Westphal said that in September the most vulnerable part of the

whole Western Front was the Luxembourg sector, leading to the Rhine at Coblenz. His evidence confirmed what Blumentritt had said about the effects of a thrust in that part — the long and thinly defended stretch of the Ardennes country between Metz and Aachen.

What are the main conclusions that emerge in the new light that has been thrown on this crucial period nearly 13 years ago?

Eisenhower's "broad front" plan of advance on the Rhine, designed before the invasion of Normandy, would have been a good way to strain and crack the resistance of a strong and still unbeaten enemy. But it was far less suited to the actual situation, where the enemy had already collapsed, and the issue depended on exploiting their collapse so deeply and rapidly that they would have no chance to rally. That called for a pursuit without pause.

In these circumstances, Montgomery's argument for a single and concentrated thrust was far better in principle. But it becomes evident, when the facts are explored, that the frustration of his thrust in the north was not really due to the diversion of supplies to Patton, as is commonly assumed. A much greater, and compound, handicap came from a series of impediments within his own orbit — the 6-day stoppage of supply by air for a superfluous object; the excessive provision of ammunition and other supplies that subtracted from the transport available for bringing up gasoline; the 1,400 defective British lorries; the "blind-alley" employment of the US First Army on his flank; the neglect to seize the bridges over the Albert

Canal before they were blown up, and the crossings manned, by the enemy.

Most fatal of all to the prospect of reaching the Rhine was the pause from 4 to 7 September after reaching Brussels and Antwerp. That is hard to reconcile with Montgomery's declared aim, in his drive from the Seine, "to keep the enemy on the run straight through to the Rhine, and 'bounce' our way across that river before the enemy succeeded in reforming a front to oppose us." *Persistent pace and pressure* is the key to success in any deep penetration or pursuit, and even a day's pause may forfeit it.

But throughout the Allied forces there was a general tendency to relax after they drove into Belgium. It was fostered from the top. Eisenhower's inter-allied intelligence staff told him that the Germans could not possibly produce sufficient forces to hold their frontier defense line — and also assured the press "we'll go right through it." Eisenhower conveyed these assurances to his subordinate commanders—even as late as 15 September he wrote to Montgomery: "We shall soon have captured the Ruhr and the Saar and the Frankfurt area, and I would like your views as to what we should do next." A similar optimism reigned in all quarters. Explaining the omission to seize the bridges over the Albert Canal, the commander of the spearhead corps, Gen Horrocks, frankly said: "I did not anticipate at that time any serious resistance on the Albert Canal. It seemed to us that the Germans were totally disorganized."

Maj John North in his history of the Twenty-first Army Group, based on official sources, has aptly summed up the situation: "a 'war is won' attitude of mind prevailed among all ranks." In consequence, there was little sense of urgency among commanders during the vital fortnight in September and a very natural inclination among the troops to abstain from pushing hard, and avoid getting killed, when everyone assumed that "the war is over."

The best chance of a quick finish was probably lost when the "gas" was turned off from Patton's tanks in the last week of August, when they were 100 miles nearer to the Rhine, and its bridges, than the British.

Patton had a keener sense than anyone else on the Allied side of the key importance of persistent pace in pursuit. He was ready to exploit in any direction — indeed, on 23 August he had proposed that his army should drive north instead of east. There was much point in his subsequent comment: "one does not plan and then try to make circumstances fit those plans. One tries to make plans fit the circumstances. I think the difference between success and failure in high command depends upon its ability, or lack of it, to do just that."

But the root of all the Allied troubles at this time of supreme opportunity was that none of the top planners had foreseen such a complete collapse of the enemy as occurred in August. They were not prepared, mentally or materially, to exploit it by a rapid long-range thrust.

US ♣ MC

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★ ★ ★ ★

### Leadership

♣ IN KOREA, DURING 1952, an officer of the 1st Engineer Battalion was making a reconnaissance of the roads in the KMC regimental area. Suddenly bearing down on him came a speeding KMC jeep. The jeep was dragging a bouncing wooden sled with a makeshift cloth target mounted on it. Then came a "WHOOOM!" The engineer dove for cover as the explosion tore up the shoulder of the road. On a slope 50 yards away was a group of Korean Marines with a bazooka. The engineer hurriedly approached them and asked what was going on. "Oh, we practice bazooka," they answered.

"Where is your platoon leader?" retorted the engineer, anxious to quell the target practice.

"Oh, he drive jeep," was their proud reply.

Maj T. C. Shanahan




### Bloodless Conquest

♣ THE PATROL had the situation well in hand. During the 2d Nicaraguan Campaign in early 1928, an officer recently arrived from the States was forthwith assigned duty in the Northern Area with Headquarters at Ocotal. A few days later, he was placed in charge of a routine visiting patrol to one of the outlying Detachments. At the first town (on a regular patrol route) they entered, the officer immediately sent the following telegram to Brigade Headquarters in Managua, "Have captured Todogalpa this date."

CWO D. Floyd

(The GAZETTE will pay \$10.00 for each anecdote published. Submissions should be short and pointed.)

# SEABOARD STRIKING




In recent months the GAZETTE has published the execution of a national strategy based on striking forces cruising the world's means. a Martin P5M was used (instead of the P6M) assault air transport as part of the surface plane sets down close aboard her "leader" the ship has already ballasted down 8 feet a towline from the ship (3) and the aircraft lines (4). The *Ashland's* pumps lift her stern (5), balanced by her beaching gear, as the ship. Although this was not a test for speed, the ship in only 26 minutes. The possibilities of demonstrating the high degree of mobility of seaplanes to the array of LSDs, ARAs and striking force.



# ABORNE ING FORCE

TE has published several articles dealing with strategy based on semi-independent mobile world's means. In the sequence pictured here of the P6M SeaMaster, a jet aircraft) as an of the surface amphibious group. As the seaplane "leader" ship (1), USS *Ashland* (LSD 1), down 13 feet at the stern (2). Crewmen affix of the aircraft is moved into position by hand os lift her stern and the seaplane is secured gear, as the stern gates of the LSD close (6). or speed, the entire operation was completed ibilities offered by such a seaplane clearly f mobility offered by adding troop-carrying Ds, ARAs and CVHAs of the amphibious


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
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# OPERATION

Organized and assembled in two and one-half months, the Royal Marine Commandos executed their first brigade-sized landing since WW II — *unrehearsed*



Wide World

By LtCol Gordon West

THE KEYSTONE OF THE BRITISH-French operations was Port Said. OPERATION MUSKETEER was the first amphibious landing of brigade size made by the Royal Marines since World War II. Royal Marine Commandos differ markedly from their counterpart, a US Marine battalion, in that they are strictly infantry and not designed as the nucleus of a battalion landing team. In the strength of 607 officers and men, a Commando consists of 5 lettered rifle troops, a support troop, and of course, a headquarters. The primary mission of Commandos is raiding, and they are so organized that reinforced troops can easily be detached from the Commando for independent duty on such missions.

Commandos are expected to operate on independent duty. Many have read of the feats of 41 Commando when it was employed under the command of Naval Forces Far East on reconnaissance along the Korean Coast. Most Marines remember the magnificent job this unit did when it was attached to the 1st Mar Div at Hungnam and the Chosin Reservoir.

In August, 3 Commando Brigade was at Cyprus in the eastern Mediterranean. Its units were 40 and 45 Commandos; all involved in the hazardous and difficult task of combating the EOKA. They had been there for 13 rugged months and during this time no opportunity had been available for training in combined arms or amphibious techniques. 42 Commando was in skeletonized strength in Great Britain. They were fortunate in that their nucleus of regularly assigned Marines had been landed in northern Norway a month before. On the whole, when brought up to strength and joined with the Brigade, the amphibious

# MUSKETEER

background of 42 Commando was meager. No supporting arms or units were in sight. The Amphibious Squadron in the Mediterranean was barely adequate to lift one Commando, its ships obsolescent and tired. Yet, in 2½ months' time, the Brigade was assembled, organized and supported for an amphibious assault. Shipping, landing craft and LVTs were on hand. Helicopters and aircraft carriers to lift a Commando had been fitted into the operational units. On L-day, 6 November 1956, 3 Commando Brigade carried off a successful assault landing at Port Said and took the port.

Assembling all major units at Malta, 3 Commando Brigade plunged into planning and training with a feeling of urgency. Immense strides had to be made, not only in amphibious training, but in assembling units to support an amphibious assault, overcoming great logistic deficiencies and supply shortages, devising helicopter doctrine, finding suitable shipping, and in improvising many things which could not be found.

Problems and difficulties were legion. Plans had a disheartening way of being radically changed just when seemingly sound. Important staffs were working in England on the overall operation and frequent consultation with the landing force was a necessity which could not be achieved. A special security classification was placed on the plans and only a relative handful of key officers were aware of where the landing would be or the scheme of maneuver. Waterproofing gear seemed impossible to acquire, aircraft control teams were pieced together and had no radios. This was a time of frantic activity and frustration.

Meanwhile the hard-pressed commanders were faced with the urgent requirement to re-indoctrinate their

troops in amphibious techniques. First came the problem of individual and troop training. Once the individual Royal Marines were considered adequately proficient, a series of amphibious landings of gradually increasing complexity was held. Meanwhile reinforcing units were joining the Brigade as this training progressed and they, in turn, had to be integrated into the amphibious team. There was, however, no opportunity for a full dress rehearsal.

Next came the problem of familiarizing 45 Commando in helicopter techniques. This unit had been selected to make a helicopter assault landing to seize two important bridges on the south of Port Said. Not the least of the difficulties encountered was that this landing means had never before been employed by the Royal Marines. In addition, the two aircraft carriers, HMS *Ocean* and HMS *Theseus* had only limited experience in the handling of helicopters. Improvisation was the order of the day. To overcome helicopter refueling problems,

for example, a gasoline truck was placed on one carrier's flight deck. A total of 22 helicopters was distributed between the two carriers.

By October, the Brigade had joined its reinforcing units and was organized for combat.

3 *Commando Brigade* (2,800 officers and men)

a) *Brigade Headquarters*

6 *Royal Tank Regiment* (48 Centurian tanks)

1 *LVT Troop, RAC* (16 LVT3s)

6 *Special Boat Section (Recon)*  
Hq 166 *Amphibious Observation Btry (NGF)*

Detach 15th *Field Ambulance Co*

371 *Postal Unit*

b) 40 *Commando*


AT Plt, 1 *Royal Berkshire Regt* (4 17-pounders, 2 106mm recoilless)

1 *Air Control Team*

1 *Tentacle, Air Support Service Unit*


Detach, 166 *Amphibious Obs Btry*

Globe and Laurel





# Scheme of maneuver in Port Said for 40, 42 and 45 Commandos



*Beach Sierra Green. The pilings indicate the left flank of 42 Commando. Many beach houses were cached with arms and munitions.*

troops, who were previously scheduled to land on 6 November at H-35, was moved up to 5 November. Working around the clock, staffs hurriedly revised their plans. 45 Commando would land as reserve and the missions of 40 and 42 Commandos were changed to fit.

The assault of Port Said was made in two separate attacks. One Brigade, less one battalion, of French paratroops was to land and take Port Fouad, across the canal from Port Said. One battalion of French paratroops was to assume the mission previously assigned 45 Commando, landing near the Golf Course to the south of Port Said and seizing two key bridges; the 3d British Paratroop Battalion to land to the west of Port Said on Gamil airfield, seize the airfield, and contain that sector of the town. Because of the likelihood of the Egyptian surrender of Port Said, it was decided to drop these units 24 hours in advance of the amphibious assault. This change in plans was appropriately dubbed OPERATION TELESCOPE.

The amphibious assault on L-day was conventional with two Commandos making the initial landing and securing those portions of Port Said within their zones of action. Their missions included contact with the paratroops. The mission of 45 Commando, in addition to initial reserve, included "Arab Town" and a link-up with the 3d Prcht Bn.

The dawn of 6 November found the amphibious shipping a mile and a half from the beaches of Port Said. Doors of LSTs gaped open and ungainly LVTs plopped into the Mediterranean. Landing craft circled and formed up for their run to the

- c) 42 Commando  
AT Plt, 1 Somerset Lt Inf (6 17-pounders)  
1 Air Control Team  
1 Tentacle, Air Support Service Unit  
Detach 166 Amph Obs Btry
- d) 45 Commando  
1 Air Control Team  
1 Tentacle, Air Support Service Unit  
Detach 166 Amph Obs Btry

On 30 October, 40 and 42 Commandos had embarked and sailed in amphibious convoy to the east. Three days later, 45 Commando had embarked and sailed in the carriers *Ocean* and *Theseus*, ready for their first helicopter assault landing—unrehearsed. Meantime, the political winds were far from steady and plans changed again enroute. 45 Commando would not make their assault landing. D-day for the para-



Looking east over the Sierra Red beach, the main lateral road and buildings which were the 3 Commando Brigade objective in Phase I. Note the closely packed beach houses on stilts of steel pilings, which could have been a formidable obstacle. Fires started by pre-H-hour bombardment caused fires in the beach houses in center of the left photograph. Sniper opportunities were unusual, since the pre-H-hour bombardment was confined specifically to the beaches in order to minimize Egyptian casualties.

line of departure. The sea was calm, and the heartening sound of naval gunfire pounding the beach with a 45-minute preparation was welcomed. Destroyers stood by under orders to return fire from the shore but none came.

40 Commando was to land on the left beach, Sierra Red, flanked on their left by a breakwater at the mouth of the Suez Canal. Their Phase I mission was to establish a narrow beachhead and consolidate for Phase II. This phase gave them the mission of breaking out and seizing the 4 ship basins to the south along the canal.

42 Commando was to land on the

right beach, Sierra Green, and join with 40 Commando in establishing the beachhead and consolidating. In Phase II they were to advance rapidly down the street Shari Muhammad Ali and seize the power and light stations for Port Said, effect liaison with the French paratroops to the south, and secure their area of Port Said.

At H-5 Royal Navy jets made their final strafing pass over the Sierra beaches. The LVTs grounded down at H-hour, heading for the first road behind the beach. They had to pass through a closely packed group of beach houses raised on steel pilings (see photo) to reach the

blocks of 6 and 7 story concrete buildings south of this main lateral road. Snipers and light automatic weapons offered no serious challenge to the landing and fortunately the beaches were free of mines.

The first wave fanned out and attacked the snipers with 3.5 bazookas, 106 mm rockets and Energa grenades. The succeeding waves came ashore in landing craft without incident, although some mortar and automatic weapons fire landed in the boat lanes.

40 Commando had been ordered to advance to Communication Basin. Two troops supported by 4 French light tanks moved down the waterfront road, bypassing the enemy in town, and arrived at Communication Basin in 15 minutes without encountering heavy resistance. They were then ordered to secure the British Consulate. Here the fight was hot and heavy, since Consulate Square was well defended. The 20-pounders of the tanks gave material assistance in neutralizing strong points, but the houses of the square had to be cleared room by room. It was a sharp fight.

The Mortar Officer of the Support Platoon, 40 Commando, was having difficulty finding a suitable OP. He, with several of his men, inspected a lighthouse which seemed to offer the best observation in the area. To his considerable surprise, on approaching the lighthouse 20 soldiers came out and surrendered to him. One of these was the Garrison Commander of Port Said, who seemed most anxious to effect a truce and stop the fighting. The Egyptian Brigadier was promptly escorted to Brigade Headquarters while the

### **The landing of the French paratroop brigade on Port Fouad**

Wide World






Commando continued to advance.

Although the enemy snipers and strong points were not many, there was sufficient opposition to make it necessary to clear each block, house by house. By the time 40 Commando had reached the area of the customs warehouses, resistance had stiffened. An Egyptian tank was encountered and destroyed, and two enemy vehicles loaded with troops fleeing from the Royal Marines were also destroyed. In taking the customs warehouses, 2 officers were killed and 3 Marines wounded.

The most strongly fortified point 40 Commando encountered was Navy House. The Egyptians resisted fiercely and stopped the advance. Tanks were brought up and blew large holes in the buildings with their guns but the fight went on. It was then decided to call in an air strike. Even though darkness had begun to creep over the embattled area, the air strike was a complete success. The Royal Marines cleared up the remaining enemy and, with darkness, halted their attack for the night.

Meanwhile 42 Commando formed up with C Squadron of the 6th Royal Tank Regiment (some 14 tanks) and loaded 3 of their troops



*Port Said itself presented a small and restricted target*



*40 Commando ran into stiff resistance and called up the tanks*

Wide World

into LVTs for a sortie into the town. They raced down Shari Muhammad Ali at 20 miles per hour, sniper fire angling down on them from buildings along the route. Their far-sighted commander had taken the precaution of leaving the tailgates of the LVTs open for rapid exit in case of need and as a means of eliminating such grenades as might be tossed inside. It happened that several Royal Marines had impromptu football practice during the speed run.

Moving into their area they were opposed by sniper fire, which was overcome successfully. This team took the power station, and cold storage depot with only minor opposition. Fortunately, the utilities were intact. They then moved on and made contact with the French paratroops, who had landed south of the golf course area the previous day. The French reported an Egyptian



battalion forming up for counterattack east of Interior Basin. 42 Commando called in a highly effective air strike and disorganized this battalion. They dispersed as a rabble, moving to the south. The air strike ended the organized resistance encountered by this Commando.

While the main body of 42 Commando was well occupied, the troops remaining in the beachhead were not idle. Brigade had ordered that the Italian Consulate be made secure. The Operations Officer took a few men, a Centurian tank and moved forward. Managing to get within the Consulate grounds, determined pounding on the door produced no results. Snipers were chipping plaster from the Consulate a bit too close for Royal Marine comfort. Discretion dictated cover. Returning to the tank this officer ordered it to push in the front entrance. The tank climbed up the entrance stairway, shoved open the doors and suddenly found itself in the hallway. The Italian Consul was somewhat startled, but gracious to this unexpected caller.

The 45 Commando received orders to land on beach Sierra Red at H-hour plus 45 on the secure beach area. In this highly efficient operation the helicopters landed 415 men and 23 tons of supplies of the 45 Commando in 83 minutes. The ruggedness of the helicopter was thoroughly demonstrated when one of them was discovered to be ventilated by some 20 bullet holes.

Their orders were to clear and hold the street, Shari Muhammad Ali and to secure the Brigade's right flank. They were then to make contact with the 3d Prcht Bn to the west. The area in which they moved, called Arab Town, was only defended by snipers. These snipers were, however, many and highly effective in slowing the advance of 45 Commando. The Royal Marines found it disconcerting that the snipers, for the most part, dressed in flowing robes. They discarded their weapons and posed as civilians when at-



*The 6th Royal Tank Regiment rendered the armored support*

tacked. There were many casualties among both the Egyptians and the Royal Marines during this difficult fight.

Meanwhile, there had been great activity in the Headquarters of 3 Commando Brigade. The Brigade Tactical Headquarters landed about H + 40 and took active command. At 0715, the Garrison Commander of Port Said had arrived at the Brigade CP and informed the Brigade Commander that he wished to stop the fighting. The Commander of the II Corps was informed of this, and he came ashore immediately. The truce talks were held at the Italian Consulate, but were not effective. While the Garrison Commander desired to surrender, his superior had ordered him over the one telephone cable to Cairo not disconnected to continue the fight. There had been no halt in the aggressive attacks of the Royal Marines.

The Commandant General, Royal Marines, Lt Gen Sir Campbell

Hardy, came ashore in the early morning by helicopter from the carrier, *Ocean*. His position at the battle is reminiscent of the fighting spirit of our former Commandant Archibald Henderson, who at the time of the Seminole War in Florida closed his office and tacked a note on the door which read: "Closed. Have gone to fight the Indians!"

Shortly after dark, the first rumors reached the troops of a cease fire. This rumor had come by way of a BBC news broadcast from London, although there was no official confirmation. Word was received later that this rumor was, in fact, true, and at 2358 on the night of 6 November, the cease fire was ordered.

As in all operations in which the Royal Marines find themselves engaged, they once again acquitted themselves with valor and distinction. The preceding short months of frantic planning and activity had come to a successful conclusion with the capture of Port Said; a tribute to the fighting tradition of all Marines.

Before the Egyptians pulled it down, the Port Said statue of Ferdinand de Lesseps wore a green Commando beret.

US & MC

**LtCol West** is the Assistant Naval Attache in London. Immediately after the Suez operations last fall he undertook to report them as best he could for the Gazette. The Commandant General of the Royal Marines gave him access to the operation reports, but, of course, so much of it still remains classified that the operation can not yet be published in detail.



✿ A unique system for remote control of any tracked or wheeled vehicle has been introduced by Lear Inc. Controlled by radio or electrical cable, a vehicle may be used for obtaining data from remote or hazardous areas via a television transmitter.


Shown above is a helicopter controlling a Marine Corps LVT through heavy surf.

✿ Honor graduate of the 5-56 Basic School Class, 2dLt Charles R. Porter, was presented with the traditional *Marine Corps Association Sword* at graduation ceremonies held at Quantico, Va. Porter returned the honor by presenting the class gift (below) to LtGen M. B. Twining. The gift will hang in the halls of the new Basic School at Camp Barrett. It is a historical panel board display containing a Revolutionary War musket, boarding cutlass and other interesting items of Marine Corps lore.



✿ Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe has announced that a Forward Scatter Communication System will link the NATO nations. This will be one of the most modern and extensive military communications systems in the world. At a cost of \$9,000,000, the new network will combine over-the-horizon tropospheric forward scatter and line-of-sight radio relay links to integrate certain international and national military communications agencies. These installations extend from eastern Turkey around the broad crescent throughout NATO Europe to the far reaches of northern Norway.

Planning, engineering and general supervision will be conducted from Paris, France, the main center of this operation.



✿ A new STOL craft (above) is being developed for the Navy by Kaman. Utilizing the already proven Fowler flaps on the wing, the plane will be given added lift by small controllable flaps buried in the trailing edge of the two propulsive rotors. These flaps provide cyclic and collective control by changing the lift characteristics of the blades, thus giving the pilot full control at less than 50 mph. Above 50 mph the rotor flap system automatically phases out and conventional controls take over. The speed of the craft would range up to 300 mph.

✿ Marines who served with the 1st MarDiv during the Chosin Reservoir fighting in Korea will be happy to learn that the Medal of Honor was awarded posthumously to Army LtCol John U. D. Page. LtCol Page was killed in Korea while single-handedly fighting an enemy force so that friendly troops, both Army and Marines, might withdraw.




✿ Scientists at Raytheon's Food Laboratory are using radar's electronic energy to preserve fresh and cooked foods so they can be stored at room temperature indefinitely.

The preserved food weighs only a fraction of the fresh product, as shown by the steaks on the scales shown above. From 70 to 95 per cent of fresh food weight is water. The water is removed by applying microwave energy while the food is held under vacuum at below freezing temperatures. When the food is needed, it is restored to its original fresh conditions in minutes without loss of flavor, texture or nutrient value, simply by immersing in water. The weight saving possibilities of such a procedure may have a valuable military application.

✿ The massive, turret-like structures aboard the Navy's missile ship *Canberra* (below) have been identified as AN/SPQ-5. They are super-radar antennae for guidance of Terrier missiles, developed for the Navy by Sperry Gyroscope Co.

The SPQ-5 radar systems include flexible modes of scanning the air space many miles beyond the horizon, providing the advantage of early warning. Individual targets can be selected from close-flying groups and tracked at great distances while the missiles are launched and guided with "extreme accuracy."





# AROUND THE WORLD WITH SIKORSKY HELICOPTERS



**RUGGED OPERATOR**—Unloading a jeep in rough terrain, this Marine Corps Sikorsky S-56 shows its usefulness under field conditions during Fleet Introduction flights at Quantico. The Marine Corps has organized its

first S-56 squadron, HMR (M)-461, at New River, N. C. The big, twin-engined S-56, which can carry 26 men and their gear, is flown as the HR2S-1 by the Marine Corps and as the H-37 by the Army.



**THE OLD AND THE NEW**—One of the last of the Army's mules and its rider from the 35th Q M Co. (Pack) meets a Sikorsky S-58 (Army H-34) bringing in rations during maneuvers near Camp Hale, Colo. The Army has announced deactivation of mule-equipped units and the creation of new helicopter companies.



**MATERNITY MISSION**—Racing the stork, a U. S. Air Force Sikorsky H-19 based at Prestwick, Scotland, flew a critically ill expectant mother from the isolated Isle of Arran across the Firth of Clyde to a hospital normally eight hours away by boat. The mother recovered; the baby girl weighed 8½ pounds.



**SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT**

BRIDGEPORT, CONNECTICUT

One of the Divisions of United Aircraft Corporation





By Capt H. A. Johnson, MC USN

# PLANNING FUTURE MEDICAL SUPPORT

In order to be effective, medical support must be based on precepts derived from medical science, military needs and combat experience



✱ EXAMINATION OF THE CHANGING pattern of amphibious assault currently developing under the helicopterborne concept leads to the impressive conclusion that the new tactic, whatever its final design, will require extensive revision in the present scheme of landing force medical support. That revision must be comprehensive, based on a consideration of the numerous elements of medical service, e.g., objectives, organization, missions and functions of various types of medical units, matériel, logistics, deployment and redeployment, triage, holdings and evacuation as well as the clinical and technical aspects of field medicine.

There seems no escape from a requirement for landing force planners to keep developments in medical support abreast of the changes in

military tactics. But what constitutes a sound approach in developing a plan for medical support under the new concept? What are the considerations? These questions in themselves comprise a creditable start for they direct the planner to the fundamentals of the problem.

It is inconceivable that tactical development under the new concept will ignore the time tested principles of war. Medical planning would do well to hold similarly to a set of established precepts. Unfortunately, however, the precepts of landing force medical service have not been clearly established as such and are not generally well recognized nor understood. Consequently, planning for medical support in the Fleet Marine Forces often lacks the positive direction of military tactical planning. Regrettable as that is, it emphasizes the need for more widespread understanding and greater use of those principles and rules which have been developed somewhat informally from past experiences. Being generally applicable in any type landing force they can serve as needed guide lines for medical planning for amphibious operations of the future.

Precepts of medical service in support of landing forces are considered to fall within 4 principal categories: 1) objectives, 2) limitations, 3) principles and 4) requirements.

#### **Objectives of Medical Service with the Fleet Marine Forces**

**Humanitarian:** The first objective, although not necessarily the most important from the immediate military standpoint, is humanitarian. This readily understood purpose is closely allied to the code of the healing arts. But there is another element, the demands of society and the responsibility of medical service to meet them. The people of our country expect that those who fight in its interest will receive the best possible medical care and of a quality consistent with the recognized priority demands of a military combatant force.

**Socio-Economic:** The second purpose of military-medical service is socio-economic in scope. This country does not have an unlimited manpower resource. The demands imposed by war are such that medical

efforts to salvage potential losses for return to military duty or to some useful occupation is compulsory in the interests of manpower economy. Moreover, in the case of the permanently disabled fighter, society feels a responsibility to itself as well as to the individual to return him to his full potential of effectiveness. This particular problem can be materially lessened or exaggerated depending upon the quality of forward area medical care.

**Direct Support of the Military Operation:** Most important to the immediate military problem is the role the medical service plays in direct support. This role is three-fold: conserving the strength of the fighting force, the evacuation of serious casualties as military impedimenta, and the contribution to the morale of the troops.

Indiscriminate medical evacuation which includes minor casualties with expected short term disabilities or those who in some instances are immediately returnable is adverse to the interests of the military command. Inappropriate evacuation results in undue delay in a man's return to his unit and often because of a "break from identity" with his outfit causes him to lose motivation. Moreover, it has been shown by competent observers that in many cases of situational emotional stress evacuation may actually delay the individual's recovery. The provision for careful sorting, holding and forward evacuation of short term disabilities or unconfirmed disabilities by all echelons of medical care is vital to the military interest. A dual military-medical responsibility exists, that to the command as well as that to the individual casualty.

Non-ambulatory casualties are impediments to the combat unit and when their expected disability, illness or injury warrants it, evacuation is in order as soon as it is compatible with the patient's condition and facilities are available. Evacuation by custom has been an assigned responsibility of medical service.

The role of preventive medicine in reducing losses from disease is well established, but appreciation of its support of a military force becomes all but lost with each new generation of military leaders. The importance of those individual and

unit measures designed to protect and maintain the health of the fighting forces needs continual re-emphasis.

The role that medical service plays in supporting the morale of troops is not always recognized. The Marine who is aware of the medical care available to him and who can feel that he will receive prompt and competent attention if disabled by illness or injury is certain to be a better fighter. In this respect medical support serves a significant purpose.

These then are considered to be the broad objectives of field medical service.

#### **Limiting Factors Affecting Medical Service with Landing Forces**

**Combat Tactical Situation the Determining Factor:** The paramount demand on a military force is to gain its objective. Medical support, however important, is secondary and must be able to adjust to a changing situation. Nevertheless, prior planning and interim revision should not fail to take cognizance (except in extreme situations) of medical support.

**Medical Load May Exceed Immediate Medical Means:** This is particularly so during the early phase of an amphibious operation, but it may occur at any time when or where casualties are heavy. To provide for maximum medical needs for any exigency for all units at all times would be prohibitive in terms of manpower and materiel. The solution is to provide for flexibility in organization and in deployment of medical resources in the form of sections or provisional units which can be assigned promptly. Under conditions created by enemy use of a nuclear weapon the problem will be exaggerated. Future planning will have to provide for far greater flexibility of medical support than in the past.

**Medically Primitive Conditions:** The load and type of casualties plus the unstable and "primitive" environment characteristic of active combat impose the need for medical compromises. The challenge is to minimize them. Much can be accomplished in this direction by training of personnel, improvement of techniques, by development of optimum items of supply and equipment, and



through effective organizational structure and operational planning. *Development of Full Landing Force Medical Support Ashore Necessarily Delayed:* Units capable of definitive care and life-saving surgery are necessarily sizable even when every effort is made to reduce weight and cube in order to gain maximum freedom of movement. Therefore, units with this capability have limited mobility and may be delayed in getting ashore. Nor does a clear indication normally exist to deploy them until there is sufficient space and security to enable them to set up and perform their primary mission. Plans must provide for medical facilities afloat capable of performing comprehensive medical care during the early phase when these facilities ashore are undeveloped. (Exceptions, however, do occur. Medical companies may have to disembark early in order to clear ships under threat or to reinforce an overwhelmed medical section ashore.)

*Medical Support Afloat May Be Interrupted:* During some past landing operations the amphibious fleet has had to leave the area because of enemy action or the threat of it. The resulting interrupted off-shore medical support has placed the full burden on that of the landing force. Storms have likewise interdicted the use of landing craft for seaward evacuation. These possibilities are among the principal reasons why generous medical support is provided for within the Fleet Marine landing force. Others are: 1) to provide holding and treatment facilities within the landing force to minimize delay in return to duty and loss of motivation of short term disabilities, and 2) to maintain close medical support when front lines move well inland and lines of evacuation to the beach become extended.

*Instability of Combat Situation:* Units capable of providing primary definitive care and large holding facilities may be rendered all but inactive by enemy threat to their in-

stallations. Likewise, a requirement to move on short notice may preclude performance of major surgical procedures, or of providing extensive holding facilities except for those casualties largely able to care for themselves. Deployment therefore must be directed with this in mind. *Primitive Health Environment:* Combat conditions require extra vigilance in the field of preventive medicine and a provision for the care of non-combat casualties. This is important in direct relation to the length of the operation. In brief engagements, exposure of troops to hazardous health conditions is less (although not entirely absent). On longer operations such is not the case. There is a tendency to think only in terms of battle casualties and indeed that is usually the largest single problem in terms of numbers and complexity. But the incidence of morbidity found in any community continues in combat. There is, in addition, the threat of communicable and environmental diseases in the primitive conditions associated with land warfare. In some instances short term non-combat disabilities may become so numerous as to place serious limitations on medical service.

*Combat Situation May Require Interim Modification of Medical Tactics:* Planned methods of administering medical service do not invariably satisfy the needs of a particular situation. Many times interim provisional units, alterations in the composition of medical units and sections, medical reinforcement, temporary changes to a somewhat unorthodox evacuation system or a change of route of evacuation effect a better efficiency. The unit medical officer cannot permit himself to be bound rigidly to a fixed plan for there are many occasions when modification benefits the operation.

#### Principles of Combat Medical Care

*Close Medical Support:* A scheme of medical support which affords early

triage, emergency care and supportive treatment offers maximum benefit to the injured and best satisfies the military requirement. Factors influencing the *effective* degree of close support attainable in any given situation are the immediate tactical situation, enemy capabilities, the supported unit's plan for the future, the feasibility of redeployment (in the case of medical companies) and those conditions that may affect the time required for evacuation between echelons. In general, the capability for conserving the fighting strength of a supported unit, saving lives and minimizing the effects of trauma in serious casualties is directly proportional to the reduction in the time and space factor between injury and medical care.

*Echelons of Medical Care:* The principle of handling serious casualties by a system of medical echelons is a necessary compromise but an effective one in combat. In the extremely unstable situation of the front lines emergency care is performed by a company aid man. It is essentially primary emergency treatment. Limited in scope, it does afford early attention by a trained medical representative. According to plan, from this echelon rearward, the casualty receives *sustained medical care* from primary, resuscitative and supportive to that more definitive in type. Compromises in the system may become necessary in unstable situations or where casualties are heavy.

*Triage:* Triage is the key to effective handling of large numbers of casualties. By definition it is the sorting of sick and injured on the basis of type of injury or condition so that they can be properly held, treated and/or routed to medical facilities appropriately situated and equipped for their care. Planning requires a scheme that best meets the responsibility to the combat unit and the individual casualty.

*Dispersion of Casualties:* When casualties are evacuated in sizable numbers to hospital-type field facilities and/or to medical facilities out of the landing force some provision must be made for dispersion to preclude, if possible, overload of any one facility beyond its maximum capabilities.

*Economy of Resources:* Both manpower and matériel must have maxi-

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**Capt Johnson** has a long association with the Marine Corps and its problems. First serving with the 23d Marines in 1942, he later was with the 4th Med Bn, 4th Mar Div until the end of WWII. After several tours at naval hospitals he became CO, 2d Med Bn in 1950, then immediately went to Korea where he was CO, 1st Med Bn and later Div Surgeon. From '53-'54 Capt Johnson was liaison officer to HQMC from BuMed. At present he is CO, Field Medical Service School, Camp Pendleton.



mum utilization in order to meet large casualty loads. Matériel should be considerably used to minimize the possibility of damage of equipment or exhaustion of supplies. Automatic exchange providing for immediate replenishment of critical items is mandatory.

The losses of hospital corpsmen in past engagements (by percentages) frequently in excess of Marines, seem exorbitant for non-combatants. Were the full story available it is suspected that this would be the result of 3 factors: 1) insufficient training of corpsmen, 2) their overeagerness in combat, and 3) poor control and/or improper utilization of corpsmen by platoon and company commanders because of lack of understanding or of a definite plan at that level.

### Requirements of Medical Service

Certain requirements exist if the objectives and principles of medical service are to be fulfilled. These likewise are fundamental. For convenience they have been grouped as follows: *General Requirements, Doctrinal Systems of field medical service, and Readiness.*

#### *General Requirements:*

1) *Flexibility* in medical organization and operational deployment of its resources has been previously mentioned. The present organization of the medical service with the Fleet Marine Forces affords great potential for flexibility; it is simply a matter of exploiting it by some plan.

2) *Informed intelligent control and deployment* is a corollary to the above. When and where to provide provisional units, what comprises a suitable composition under the particular circumstances, when and how to reinforce medical companies or sections or to change their immediate mission are as essential to the plan as is the provision for flexibility itself.

3) *Mobility* compatible with the combat situation. Reasonable mobility must be maintained to insure the capability of maintaining close medical support as the front moves. For obvious reasons this capability is less with larger medical units. However, this lesser degree of mobility can often be compensated for by maintaining one or two units in an inactive or partially active status



**Medical support must be organized to satisfy military requirements**

prepared to move when redeployment is indicated.

4) *Liaison and Rapport* among medical sections and units and between them and supported commands leads to better efficiency through understanding of the other's problems, improved knowledge of the situation and of current and future plans.

5) *Communications* furnish means for prompt exchange of pertinent intelligence between various medical facilities. Unit surgeons should have means of ready communications with subordinate units to effect efficient co-ordination of medical supply and medical care and evacuation.

6) *Collateral Support:* Medical company units are not totally self-sustaining. In addition to occasional assistance in security, they may require other support including motor transportation and engineer services.

7) *Versatility of Personnel:* There is a need for certain specialized medical skills in combat medical units. But this specialization should not be to the exclusion of versatility. The care and handling of casualties often requires an ability for every man to perform general techniques. This necessitates a background of basic field medical skills which must not be permitted to go unrefreshed. Medical personnel for the most part resist refresher training either because they feel they are too elementary or relatively unimportant. On the other hand, many are too overconfident that they already know or "can do the procedure anyway if they have to." Observation has shown the fallacy of this complacent

attitude exhibited by many instances of unacceptable performance in combat. A program of refresher training is needed similar in principle to that of the Marine infantryman who is taught to perform individual procedures almost automatically under the stress of combat, by an intensive continual process of retraining in his basic skills.

*Doctrinal Systems of Medical Service:* As in all military planning, military medical planning employs certain systems which are more or less doctrinal. A few seem particularly pertinent and worthy of mention as fundamentals of field medical service.

1) *System for medical evacuation of casualties:* By accepted interpretation this function consists of an orderly method of sorting and of moving casualties rearward through a series of medical echelons designed to provide sustained medical care. The method and extent of medical evacuation is largely determined at any given time by the period in the development of medical support ashore, by the physical features of the area (terrain, roads, etc), the available means of transportation, the number and type of medical facilities in operation, the condition of the casualty and the immediate combat situation.

Plans for a medical evacuation system should include all available means of transportation. The high success experienced with a particular method employed under one set of conditions should not be permitted to influence the planner unduly. Principles of selective evacuation



***Medical answers to many problems will depend on the tactical scheme***

and of holding should be scrupulously adhered to whenever possible in order to maintain the availability of appropriate evacuation facilities.

2) *Casualty holding system:* Facilities for holding certain types of casualties when the situation permits gives an opportunity for resuscitation and supportive treatment to those in too serious condition for immediate evacuation. It also obviates the requirements for evacuation of short term disabilities thus facilitating their early return to duty with minimum loss of time and of motivation.

3) *System of Echelons of Medical Care of Casualties:* This has already been discussed elsewhere.

4) *System of Unit Medical Sections:* Aside from their part in contributing to the plan of sustained medical care of casualties, organic medical sections look after the immediate needs of the parent military community. The unit medical officer develops an interest and a balanced sense of dual military-medical responsibility to his organization. This requirement is not necessarily contradictory to that for flexibility. Usually sufficient flexibility in deployment can be effected by the use of medical battalion personnel and parts of unit medical sections of those units having more than one medical officer assigned.

5) *System of Triage and Priority:* Some system of triage and of categorizing casualties by priorities for treatment and evacuation is an essential provision for handling large casualty loads. Classification should be made to determine the manner and order of treatment and disposition of cases.

6) *System of Standardized Procedures:* Standardization of treatment procedures is not ideal from a clinical point of view, but it is a neces-

sary compromise in handling large numbers of casualties. Some cases will require immediate and full attention of a medical officer and a system of standardization will permit these personnel to devote more time to the cases requiring it. In the less complicated cases medical officers will assume the role of supervisor.

7) *System of Medical Logistics:* Medical units require essential supplies and equipment to function properly. Resupply is a continuing requirement and any medical plan must incorporate a workable system to provide effectively for all units.

8) *System of Administrative Procedures:* In addition to logistics, those procedures having to do with personnel accounting, reporting, casualty recording and numerous other administrative operations in support of medical service are required.

***Readiness:***

Continued readiness as a requirement deserves special mention. In consonance with the high state of preparedness for combat required of FMF units, medical activities must maintain a commensurate state of readiness to support those forces in the event of early commitment. Compromise interim manning levels dictated by the necessity for economy of manpower, rapid turnover of FMF medical personnel and the lack of prior FMF experience of most incumbents exaggerates the need for intensive preparation. This requires a continued program of training in individual skills, in unit or section drills and in BLT, RCT and division exercises and maneuvers. In the past it has been a common complaint of medical officers that training plans for exercises and maneuvers do not give sufficient recognition to medical tactics. The resulting token participation of medi-

cal troops allowable under those circumstances is of limited benefit. This paucity of emphasis is perhaps understandable, preoccupied as unit commanders are with innumerable aspects of training more directly related to military preparation. Nevertheless, failure to provide for adequate military-medical training cannot be condoned on that basis. It is a disservice to hold as some do, that medical personnel are basically trained in the skills necessary for casualty care and therefore do not require special preparation. Medical service in landing force operations is a complex system, in many respects different from that elsewhere. Readiness to perform that service in combat requires a knowledge of many things more or less peculiar to this type of operation. It implies at the very least an optimum working nucleus of medical personnel grounded in objectives, familiar with methods, facilities, equipment and medical tactics, physically fit and with a sense of identity with a unit. Only in this manner can there be full opportunity to develop a program equal to the combat mission. The increased interest in medical tactics on the part of unit commanders recently noted in some areas is undoubtedly due to the possibility of mass casualties in nuclear warfare. This increased emphasis is heartening. It should be continued but with a comprehensive consideration of all aspects of military-medical service.

With respect to the medical officer, his professional clinical skill can be assumed considering the present standards of formal medical education. Three special fields, however, may be insufficiently familiar to those medical officers with limited military experience. They are 1) field preventive medicine, 2) the care and handling of war wounds and 3) combat psychiatry. The military physician faced with the possibility of combat service would do well to school himself in a practical working knowledge in those areas.

***Special Problems in Landing Force Tactics with Nuclear Weapons***

In order to properly orient, can it not be assumed that two general interrelated situations may be created: 1) that incident to helicopter borne assault, and 2) that produced



by the capability of enemy nuclear retaliation or actual nuclear retaliation itself? The medical answers are by no means obvious for the nature of the support will largely depend upon the military tactical design and that has not been finally determined. Also, it is not possible to separate considerations exclusively into two categories for it is certain that retaliative or initial defensive employment by the enemy will have to be considered unless the enemy capability is clearly non-existent. The separate discussion therefore is more for convenience.

*Situation of Helicopter Airborne Assault:* In this situation medical forces should be committed for definite purposes and for clear cut indications, not indiscriminately merely to satisfy custom.

Military units will be more dispersed. This plus the requirement to mass and unmass quickly will increase the requirements for mobility of forward units to accomplish suitable medical support. Faster means of transportation, reduction of weight, and cube and selective medical outfitting based on unit mission will be essential. Security of medical sections and units in support of assault forces is apt to be a greater problem in so fluid a situation, particularly where deep penetration is made initially. The anticipated duration of the operation, the number and types of casualties expected, and the particular tactical scheme will all be essential considerations in planning.

The greater dispersion will increase the problem of communications and medical evacuation will be a greater problem and one more difficult to co-ordinate. Medical resupply will require a revised system designed to satisfy the needs of scattered isolated units. Lack of continuity with beaches where a deep penetration is the initial tactic will deny conventional means of medical evacuation from forward areas. Holding capabilities will be more restricted in forward areas. Facilities for extra-force medical evacuation will be limited, initially at least, to returning helicopters and except as some practical means for intermediate disposition is devised, casualties will have to be returned to the "mother ship." If this proves to be

the case, heli-carriers will be required to have the capability of casualty handling and treatment. Where casualty load exceeds available evacuation facilities, supplementary systems and the provision for holding facilities will be necessary.

It is interesting to conjecture that in the event of pre-assault use of an atomic weapon there will be the fewest number of casualties early in the operation and when there is the least medical means ashore. This is somewhat different from the usual experience in a conventional amphibious operation. Later, if and when the enemy reacts, casualties will occur and these will be from conventional weapons in the absence of enemy nuclear retaliation. Medical support by this time may be sufficiently developed for optimum handling and care of "normal" casualty loads.

*Situation Created by Enemy Nuclear Weapon Capability:* The key to planning here is to provide for maximum pre-employment of passive defense measures in an effort to reduce casualties to a minimum and also to prepare a system for mass casualty handling in the event of misadventure. When, despite passive defense measures, a sizable combat force is within the effective zone of the weapon several alterations of the conventional medical situation will obtain. Casualties will occur in greater numbers and almost instantaneously. Multiple injuries will be common although incidence in percentages by type of injury and by severity (except for burns and for radiation casualties, the latter not of primary medical importance) will be similar. Essentially, the casualty situation (other than for burns) will not be remarkably different from that where conventional weapons are used, except in magnitude. The casualty load will abruptly exceed the immediately available medical means beyond that more than rarely experienced in conventional warfare. When and if medical support can be brought into play the principles of triage and priority, standardization of casualty handling and treatment, and an increased responsibility for hospital corpsmen and for paramedical personnel with the medical officer as supervisor will require broad application. The optimum system

of management will be more than ever that designed to accomplish the greatest good for the greatest number. This will necessitate even a greater departure than heretofore from the traditional priority system. It will be even less feasible or sound from a military-medical standpoint to expend the greatest proportion of resources on extreme cases in heroic efforts to save life according to professional code and custom while facilities are clogged with minor cases (estimated as high as 40 per cent of total) who can be returned immediately or following minimal treatment to some duty capacity in a military exigency. This adjustment of philosophy comes hard but must be realistically applied within the broad mission of military-medical service. This also will not be new but simply an exaggeration of what has been necessary, in lesser degree, in past operations.

The development of medical plans for amphibious operations cannot be permitted to lag if medical service is to keep step with the changing requirements. Sound military-medical planning, no less than military planning, requires a doctrinal base from which to develop. Precepts of medical service for landing forces have not previously been set forth as such, nor clearly defined "so that he who runs may read." Medical support in order to be fully effective must be based on these precepts derived from medical science, social and economic demands, military needs and combat experience. Recognition of, and emphasis on, their importance as guides for planning seem paramount if confusion and misdirection are to be avoided in an atmosphere of imagination and experimentation. Properly interpreted they give better perspective; artfully applied they will insure rational direction to medical planning for amphibious operations of the future.

US 7 MC





# TITO'S



● MARSHAL JOSEPH BROZ TITO ended World War II with a fishing boat Navy, a few British airplanes and an 800,000-man Army: an ill-equipped, disorganized military plant in which 96 per cent of the officers lacked formal military training and many of the enlisted men were illiterate. Today Tito commands the strongest military force in the Balkans: a Navy of modern light craft, cored around a few destroyers; an Air Force spearheaded by F-84 jet aircraft; and a large standing Army. This is a military plant that, despite certain serious shortcomings, has become a positive factor in the calculations of both East and West.

Although Tito has given the three services equal standing and is continuing to expand both the Navy and Air Force, the Army is the *sine qua non* of the military. It is by far the largest of the services and the top defense commands are held by Army officers.

The size of Tito's Army is a closely guarded secret as is nearly everything else in Yugoslavia. Independent and reliable estimates average out to a minimum 300,000 active duty officers and men. A large organized reserve could bring this figure very quickly to the million mark not counting auxiliary defense units such as the Home Guard.

Central Headquarters in Belgrade commands 4 armies located as follows: First Army at Belgrade, Third Army at Skopje, Fifth Army at Zagreb and Seventh Army at Sarajevo. Each Army includes two corps of in-

fantry divisions, artillery and tank brigades and supporting troops. About half of the alleged 30 infantry divisions are said to be at full strength (12-14,000) and a few are motorized. Some of the artillery is motorized, some horse-drawn. The bulk of armor operates in independent brigades which will be raised to division strength as soon as tank supply permits. A few border divisions have tank battalions attached to them while one regiment of horse cavalry headquartered at Vrsac Aleksinac still patrols the flat northeast Rumanian and Bulgarian border zones. Specialist units like paratroopers, mountain- and ski-troops have been trained in limited quantity and are probably controlled direct from Belgrade along with the most important and unique specialist units, the numerous Partisan detachments located throughout Yugoslavia.

Until a few years ago the Army was equipped variously with captured enemy materiel taken from World War II, post-war reparation deliveries and Russian materiel supplied from 1945-48. Since 1951, standardization and modernity have been partially achieved both from American aid and domestic production.

Only 17 per cent of the modest pre-war armament industry survived WWII. From 1948-1952 Tito poured an annual 250 million dollars into a rebuilding program that included extensive training of key armament personnel. Thirty-seven new fac-

tories are now claimed to supply all light and medium weapons including rifles, automatic rifles, machine-guns, mortars, rocket launchers and light artillery as well as ammunition. Development and production of new weapons is also claimed. For example the BB-3 120 mm mortar which according to the *Yugoslav Army Review*, "can be placed on extremely soft ground and fired many times in rapid succession without sinking in . . . and if fired from a hard surface, paved road or stone, there will be no tossing."

The industry recently filled a 5½-million dollar off-shore ammunition contract—the Yugoslav Government quotes US Chief Inspector Rash as saying that "this is the highest quality ammunition produced in Europe under the off-shore program . . . inspection of your factories has shown that the capacities for the production of ammunition in Yugoslavia by far exceed those of most European countries." Current surplus production is claimed and it is known that Yugoslavia recently sold armaments to Egypt but this may prove political rather than surplus production.

Although Yugoslavia plans the production of heavy artillery, armor and jet aircraft, it has been and is at the moment dependent on American aid for these and many other items. Under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 as amended and the Mutual Security Act of 1951, we have given Yugoslavia around one-half billion dollars

# ARMY

**... is today the strongest military force in the Balkans**

**By Capt Robert B. Asprey**

All photographs supplied by the author from Yugoslav sources



*From Partisan masses of 1945, Yugoslav forces have developed into a well-equipped force with modern aircraft*

worth of military aid. The results are partially seen on parade days, when the bulk of equipment rolling by is US.

An intensive post-war training program is claimed to have given a formal military education to all Partisan veteran officers plus teaching over 400,000 enlisted men how to read and write. New officers are trained in the Belgrade Military Academy where 2 years are spent in general training, the third in special branch training. Four Superior Military Academies train senior officers, many of whom since 1952 have studied in America at Forts Sill, Monmouth, Belvoir, Knox and Benning. A number of key specialists in some units have also been trained by US teams in Yugoslavia.

A conscription act furnishes re-

cruits for a 3-year service after they have completed a multi-year "pre-military training." Under a 1948 law any youth, male or female, worker or student, must enter pre-military training when 17 years of age. He then studies theoretical military subjects augmented once a year by practical training at one of 4,000 rural training camps where he is taught by reserve officers and NCOs.

Army training is very rigorous but is tempered by a heavy athletic program that permits some units to devote as many as 3 days a week to sports. Discipline is swift and harsh. Pay is minute: a private makes 75 cents a month, a captain 40 dollars. Neither commissaries nor family medical care is provided, but other perquisites including family allowances are generous, the more so for

senior officers. Specialists receive outstanding treatment: an Army dentist colonel reported his income at 200 dollars a month (a fabulous sum in Yugoslavia) plus use of a chauffeured car, a free apartment and servants and free education for his children — but he is not free to resign from the Army. In general, it may be said that the average soldier and the average officer are much better off materially than they would be in civilian life.

Two particular aspects disavow this Army from Western military doctrine. The first is political. An Army officer writing in a military journal stated that early in the Partisan War Tito "injected a new element into discipline, that primary military virtue—consciousness. The foundation of military discipline is a high level of political consciousness. The higher it is, the stronger, more impeccable the discipline. Thus he advised and demanded that attribute which other armies either lack or possess in negligible proportion: intensive, day-to-day educational work with the troops."

The post-war era has not neglected this concept. Most of Yugoslavia's senior officers are Communist Party members. Junior officers and NCOs are encouraged to fit themselves for party membership. All officers and NCOs must study and pass rigid examinations on such subjects as History of the National Liberation War, Creation and Development of the Yugoslav People's Army, History of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Economy of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Dialectical Materialism and the International Worker's Movement. Army


#### *Headquarters of the regional field armies*





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**The Yugoslav Army, organized to utilize its native topography, has horse cavalry as well as armored units**

units receive a million political lectures a year plus 700,000 related lectures on sociological, technological and cultural subjects!

The other aspect, and one closely related to the political, is the Army's participation in civil affairs. Official sources state that since 1945 the Army's contribution "to the socialist building up of the community was 156,539,516 work hours given to the country either by building new objects or by helping the agriculture . . ." Two large railroad construction projects were aided by "78 working brigades of servicemen;" of "80,000 servicemen . . . engaged in the building of the Belgrade-Zagreb highway . . . 40,000 were awarded the Shock-Worker's badge." From 1949-1955 "117,117 civilians, suffering from various diseases, were medically and surgically treated in the Military-Medical Academy and other military hospitals." Soldiers alone constructed the Belgrade Stadium which seats 60,000. Besides building nearly all of their own installations, Army units participate in flood and avalanche rescue and control including the construction of dams.

The never easy task of rating a performance potential of an Army is doubly difficult in the case of Yugoslavia which treats any foreigner with a suspicion bordering on the morbid. Localized observations, however, coupled with the few known facts may be synthesized into an indicative whole.

Individually, the Yugoslav soldier is a wonderful physical specimen who can travel long distances on short rations. He is heir to an ancient tradition of rugged fighting with an attendant fatalistic indiffer-

ence to death. Two of the best Austro-Hungarian Army regiments—the *Varazdin* and *Otocac*—were Croatian; the fighting quality of the World War I Serb was universally respected; the bravery and endurance of the World War II Partisan can not be questioned.


On parade the soldier is turned out quite well, but his off-duty military bearing is downright sloppy. He is generally uniformed like a member of Coxey's Army, although this is not his fault. In large cities one sees him walking arm in arm with one or more of his comrades, he is often unshaven and his salute to passing officers is either perfunctory or non-existent. He does not seem to have any particular pride in his Army, he does not appear to be very happy and more often than not

he looks extremely primitive.

He is said to learn very rapidly, an ability that is qualified by an omnipresent desire to save face. When Brigadier Maclean procured dehydrated rations for a Partisan Army unit during WW II his cooking instructions were brushed aside with, "We know all about that." The soldiers then ate the dry food and chased it with copious amounts of water thus burdening still further the meagre medical facilities. On the other hand Maclean writes that if sufficient tact were exercised, "they made excellent pupils, grasping with remarkable rapidity the mechanism of a new weapons and showing the greatest ingenuity in applying it to the peculiar conditions of guerrilla warfare."

Contemporary observers do not

### **The organization of the defense establishment**





**Backed by a competent munitions industry, the Army is building up its strength.**

credit the Yugoslav soldier with a spectacular grasp of things mechanical, hardly surprising since the majority were raised remote from the internal combustion influence. "They are all right in small weapon maintenance," one observer said, "but when it comes to heavy equipment they are incapable of understanding much less performing preventive maintenance." This criticism was partially confirmed by personal observation of two convoys whose US trucks looked as if they had endured several months of rugged combat plus a motor pool of new US trucks, spotted with rust and standing on half-inflated tires.

Army maneuvers shed little light on performance because foreign observers are only rarely invited to the few that are held—presumably for financial reasons there have been only two large ones since the war, the last in Croatia in September 1953. The purpose of this 8-day maneuver, according to Gen Jovanic, was "to strengthen further the defenses of Yugoslavia and to test the combat preparedness of the Yugoslav Army units." Large numbers of reserves were called up, some units consisting of 75 per cent reserve enlisted and 20 per cent reserve officer strength. Unit mobility was stressed, the troops covering an average of 12 miles a day, while an integral part was played by independent Partisan detachments operating behind "enemy" lines. Foreign observers were later quoted by the Yugoslavs as being very impressed with the *esprit de corps* and combat endurance of the troops as well as with the technical mastery of new US weapons. These remarks must

be tempered, however, by recognition of the demands of Western courtesy coupled with the Western open wooing of Tito at that time.

In 1954 foreign observers witnessed an artillery firing demonstration and subsequently adjudged it first-rate. "But remember," one said, "that this outfit was officered by Fort Sill trained people firing US artillery drawn by US vehicles. Most of Tito's artillery does not approach this standard of performance."

Tito's military potential is seriously hindered by 2 factors: supply and personnel. Like the rest of his industrialization program, his limited armament production has been gained at a whopping and even disruptive overall cost reflected by his present lack of foreign credit and his current million-ton wheat deficit in a country that used to produce millions of tons annual surplus. The ignorance, inefficiency and corruption so markedly noticeable in other state enterprises and even admitted by the Yugoslav Government are probably not lacking in the armament industry. Speaking of Yugoslav shipyards, an experienced Lloyd's surveyor recent said, "Progress since 1950 has been astounding and the industry is today building first-rate ships. But they are not building many. They pay terrible wages but their ships are probably the most expensively built ships in the world and they lose money on each one sold abroad!"

For over 5 years Tito's industrial illness has been treated by large injections of military and economic aid from the West. But in an attempt to play a game of neutrality hopelessly incompatible to the day

sympathy of the West, final result in withdrawal of all international power seriously diminish or he will deal with Russia which would his domestic popularity. Too, it doubtful if Russia would or could fully compensate the Western loss and without that Tito would find himself in a grand economic mess.

A more direct hindrance is personnel. The majority of the pre-war professional officer corps would have nothing to do with Tito and were either eliminated during the Partisan war or fled to the West. Partisan officers brought a military political guerrilla experience, but little or no training in modern warfare, limited amount of artillery, difficult to maintain the 10 per cent of the officer corps who the military academy could very well survive in modern warfare in which they have had no experience. Yet 90 per cent of the present commands are held by Partisan officer veterans.

This is not to deny the Army a specific capability. It has already played a major background role in Tito's domestic and foreign policies. It is strong enough to more than hold its own in a local Balkan war or to fill any sudden Balkan power vacuum created by Russian withdrawal or collapse, particularly in Albania and Bulgaria. In case it were allied with Russia in an all-out war, it would be capable of launching limited penetrations north into



Austria, southeast into Greece, and it would cause the West to think twice before attempting to land on Yugoslav shores.

What Tito hopes his Army is capable of doing is to keep him neutral in case of world war. The West would probably condone Yugoslav neutrality, at least initially, simply because the enemy would suffer more inconvenience from it than we. To deny Russia the Ljubljana Gap would force her to invade Italy through the more defensible Klagenfurt Gap in Austria, while to deny her the Struma and Dragoman Passes would force her to invade Bulgaria through Macedonia.

... decides to invade Greece or both ... care to exchange communication ... at ... may ...

Yugoslavia's ... has been suggested by ... one of Tito's ablest officers ... writes that small countries ... Yugoslavia should not "fail to put up ... resistance to any invader." ... the enemy prove too strong ... suicidal "to risk the army ... operations." ... sacrificed, but the army ... regain the territory ... save the country should not fight a ... war" with small scattered partisan groups, ... "the modern territorial war is a ... 'big war' which is conducted by major regular units ...

... joint ... the ... distinct from ... which is usually ... rilla warfare."

A number of factors suggest that this is the logical war for Yugoslavia to fight in case of a Russian invasion. A conventional defense is made untenable by Yugoslavia's exposed position vis-à-vis Russian air bases on



**Formal training in the US for officers has raised the level of artillery proficiency**

neighboring satellite fields, by inadequate interior lines of communication and not least by the vast difference in the Yugoslav ... WW II, it was ... amount of Soviet strength and would furnish both a psychological and intelligence value.

(Until American OSS and British SOE files are opened the exact contribution of the Partisan effort can not be more fully determined than at present. Most post-war accounts, particularly Yugoslav and some ... have greatly exaggerated ... of these operations.

... never able to ... between Au ... not extend ... attacks and harassing ... railroad lines, factories, ... road convoys and isolated outposts. The single and final Yugoslav offensive was undertaken when Ger-

many was breaking on all fronts—this was aided by the Soviet Red Army whose contribution was judged by Yugoslavia as "not of decisive importance." The Partisans did tie down a number of Bulgarian and German divisions, but the major reason for the German strength in Yugoslavia was Hitler's ... of an Allied landing on the ... which, incidentally, he also ... in Norway where he tied down considerably more German divisions than in Yugoslavia. Although the Partisans inflicted considerable casualties on the Axis besides instilling fear and uncertainty in their ranks and although no commander, as Gen G. B. Erskine used to say, "likes to have a knife in his back," the Yugoslav Partisan operations can be called in no sense decisive to the European War.)

But is such a war the most logical? It would once again reduce internal Yugoslavia to a shambles and, ... of Russian manpower, it ... of Yugoslav ... a strat ... considers ... com ... Tito ... that ... a better than even chance of ... a Russian invasion, but of preventing one entirely. Tito seems determined to reject this—his best chance for survival.

**Capt Asprey** is a Reserve officer who is presently residing in Europe. A former intelligence officer, he served with FMFLant prior to being released to inactive duty. During WW II he served with the 5th Mar Div.

US MC





# THE BRAIN PICKERS of

## BARRETT HALL

By Maj Dennis D. Nicholson, Jr.



♣ BRAIN-PICKING IS AN ART PRACTICED by a dedicated group of Marine officers who work in Quantico's Barrett Hall.

This art involves soliciting ideas from the minds of associates and injecting these thoughts into development channels.

Barrett Hall is a 2-story, red brick building located on the Potomac side of the railroad tracks dividing the main area of Marine Corps Schools. The building was named for the late MajGen Charles D. Barrett, a pioneer in the development of amphibious techniques and equipment. As a major, Barrett headed the committee which in 1933 drafted the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations, the document that served as the basic guide for all US amphibious operations in WW II.

Barrett Hall houses Headquarters of the Marine Corps Development Center, the Marine Corps Tactics and Techniques Board. It is difficult to imagine that there could be under one roof any group more adept at procuring, processing and developing ideas. The brain-pickers are the officers who fill billets in these organizations.

Brain-picking is made necessary by the mission of the Development Center. The mission is spelled out in Marine Corps Order 3900.2A. The Center must develop, evaluate and recommend tactics and techniques for employment by Marine Corps forces. It also develops, assists in the development of, tests and evaluates equipment for use by the Ma-

rine Corps. These things are done under the direction of the Co-ordinator of Marine Corps Landing Force Development Activities. He ensures that these missions are accomplished in co-ordination with the Marine Corps Educational Center, a next-door neighbor to Barrett Hall.

Ideas are the most priceless commodities required in accomplishing the Development Center mission. Marine Corps Order 3900.2A states the basic objectives of the Center. To equip itself to attain these objectives, the Center must stimulate and promote the growth of ideas within the Marine Corps for the development of tactics, techniques and equipment for employment by US Marine Corps forces with particular emphasis on those aspects which pertain to amphibious operations and the defense of advance naval bases."

The 10 January 1955 issue of *Time* magazine said "... the US Marine Corps is teeming with new ideas. It is the open intention of the Marines to move toward the ability to carry all their fighting men in helicopters. They would be supported by nuclear bombs, rockets and artillery fire so as to create atom-scoured 'beachheads' up to 70 miles inland. Having landed, some of the troops would secure supply and communications lines by moving back to the real beaches through 'atomic sanitized corridors.'" This statement was in a special *Time* report on "A new military policy for the age of atomic deadlock."

Without commenting on the total

accuracy of *Time's* analysis, it can be said that it is true that the Corps is teeming with new ideas. Since ideas are so important to research and development, we are lucky that this is fact.

With a Corps brim-full of ideas in an era when new techniques and new equipment must evolve rapidly and economically, we require a clearing house for ideas. That clearing house is the Marine Corps Development Center.

The Center is organized to accomplish its double-barreled mission. As a former Secretary of the Center said, "The Development Center is organized and equipped to take ideas, cultivate them, and make them grow into a practical technique or piece of equipment which will do the most good for the most Marines."

The Director of the Center, with a small co-ordinating staff, provides policy direction and control for the two boards that make up the Center. The Tactics and Techniques Board is concerned with developing tactics and techniques for amphibious operations and defense of advance naval bases.

The Marine Corps Equipment Board, in co-ordination with the Tactics and Techniques Board, handles the equipment side of the Development Center's mission.

In addition to its two Boards, the Development Center was recently assigned "control responsibility" for the Marine Corps Guided Missile Test Unit. This Unit, located at the US Naval Ordnance Test Station,

China Lake, California, is a vital adjunct of the Center in the test and evaluation of selected guided missile systems and components.

The octopus-like organization of the Development Center extends its brain-picking tentacles into the Fleet Marine Force and the research and development agencies of other Services. This is accomplished through liaison officers. In the Development Center liaison is big business. A Marine Corps Development Center Liaison Officer is stationed at Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic and Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force Pacific. Others are at Headquarters Air Proving Ground, Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Center, Indian Head, Md., and Headquarters, Continental Army Command. One is at each of the 6 Continental Army Command Boards. A liaison officer is likewise stationed at the Army Quartermaster Research and Development Center, and one at the Signal Corps Electronics Laboratory. In addition some 50 other officers perform full or part-time liaison at schools or developmental activities of the various services. The results of all such liaison is available to the Director, Marine Corps Development Center, directly or through CMCLFDA.

These liaison officers ensure that up-to-date field thinking is injected into Development Center projects. The liaison officers with other Services ensure that Marine Corps equipment requirements are reflected in development projects of the other Services. All of them contribute to keeping the field informed of what the Center is doing.

The Center's thought-gatherers in the field are the liaison officers. They keep soliciting developmental views and sending them back for deposit in the idea bank. The Center processes these new concepts in clearing-house style. Some fresh theories are balanced out by tried-and-true ones of greater merit. Some overlap other thoughts already being tested. Many, though, are credited to the valuable

ideas account and invested in a developmental project.

The Development Center dates back to fall of 1950. The initial organization was established by the Commandant of the Marine Corps as he sought an efficient method of carrying out his legal developmental responsibilities.

Barrett Hall was the maternity ward for the birth of this ambitious 10-year plan to provide new concepts and complementary equipment for future amphibious operations.

Early implementation of the "new" concept for amphibious operations required the Development Center to prepare a new document, The Marine Corps Equipment Development Policy and Guide. This new publication provides guidance for research on and development of equipment required by the Marine Corps in carrying out its legal missions.

In evolving the Marine Corps Equipment Development Policy and Guide, sources throughout the entire Marine Corps are drawn upon. All liaison officers connected with material development were briefed on the project. They were requested to make recommendations or to submit matter that might be of assistance in preparing a more comprehensive document. Key Fleet Marine Force officers were contacted on a personal basis and their opinions secured. The Development Center was really the gathering, screening and preparation agency that took Marine Corps-wide thought and worked it into a definite form.

Today the spotlight is on the new concept. However, the light would be pretty dim had not Barrett Hall produced the right kind of developmental thinking from the beginning of the Development Center. Many of the Center's early activities formed the pillars on which the new concept's foundation rests.

It is through its individual projects that the Development Center has contributed most toward accomplishing its mission. Its current status reports list more than 100 active

projects. They run the gamut of equipment from a light weight revolver to rubber tired tractors. Tactics and techniques projects deal with amphibious subjects ranging from helicopter-mounted searchlights to a study and evaluation of new air defense tactics for amphibious operations.

As can be seen, the Corps' development program has pretty well harnessed the developmental power of commands. Still, the Development Center depends, to a large extent, on individual ideas as grist for the thinker mill. There is a fairly steady flow of such material but there should be a flood of it. Marines obviously have the ideas. All commands should encourage their members to overcome inertia and submit the ideas in accordance with Marine Corps Order 3900.2A.

One area in which fresh ideas are likely to provide substantial assistance to the Marine Corps is that of doctrinal publications. The foreword used in the new format for Landing Force Manuals and Landing Force Bulletins states, "Recommendations for improving this Manual (Bulletin) are invited. Such recommendations should be forwarded to CMCLFDA. Through this approach appropriate ideas will be referred to the Center for incorporation into its program.

Seneca said, "The best ideas are common property." In the case of the Development Center, this can be true only if the maximum possible number of ideas find their way to the Center for evaluation. When in doubt, send in the idea. All individuals are encouraged to submit their ideas through channels to the Director, Marine Corps Development Center.

If you have an idea and don't submit it, it is your responsibility that people don't believe in your idea. Remember that you may get a letter of appreciation from the Commandant of the Marine Corps (with a copy put in your official record) after any idea you submit has been evaluated and accepted. US MC

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**The Development Center is a clearing house for the flow of ideas coming in from the field**

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## JR OFFICER - SR NCO RELATIONSHIP

✿ MILFORD, DEL.—The chain of command which transmits the directives and policies of Headquarters Marine Corps down to the working level is often times a long one composed of many links. If the original intention of Headquarters are to be carried out effectively, we must look to these different links in order to prevent a watering down or a serious deflection of course or policy. One of the most important of these links is the one that exists at the junior officer-senior noncommissioned officer level.


At this level the directives and policies leave the hands and minds of the officers to be taken up by the enlisted men and yet survive another transmission or two before they reach the people for which they were intended, the operating Marine in the ranks. To survive the transmission of officer to noncommissioned officer and still maintain its exact content and intent is often difficult. To maintain this link at the highest degree of efficiency requires understanding, co-operation and the thoughtful practice of all the principles of leadership and command relationship.

First, let us discuss some of the ways in which the junior officer can help to smooth out this relationship. The basic rules for conduct of the junior officer in the Marine Corps are laid down in black and white in numerous directives and are frequently mentioned by senior officers, but it might be well to re-affirm some of these basic rules from the viewpoint of a senior noncom. Few junior officers realize how closely they are observed and how easily a few unguarded moments can cause a serious loss of respect. This loss is detrimental to a smooth working relationship. The young officer should be ever watchful of his conduct to hold this respect. The following paragraph will point out some ways to help him in this important aspect of his career.

If he reports to work in civilian clothes, the clothing should be neat and more on the conservative side than the jitterbug side. The car he owns should also be conservative and the operation of the car, itself, should be in accord with the rules of courteous driving. If the officer's personal effects are kept where they are under observation of en-

listed men, special pains should be taken that these personal effects are very neatly kept. It goes without saying that his uniforms should always be clean, well pressed and properly worn. Observance of the above rules will create an impression of maturity and good judgment which the senior noncom expects in his leader.

The young officer should not become embroiled in the verbal horseplay that often arises among the NCOs. Failure to heed this advice will invariably lead to a situation wherein the officer will be embarrassed. To take part in the good humored raillery of the NCOs is a mark of familiarity and the young officer can never afford to violate the rule of relationships which states that the leader should be fair, firm, and friendly but never familiar.



Failure on the part of the young officer to allow his chief assistant to use his initiative and exercise his authority is often another pitfall which causes a strained relationship. The officer member of this team should take frequent inventory of his conduct to insure that he is allowing the senior noncom to do his job without unnecessary and oversupervision. In this connection it might be well to mention the absolute necessity of supporting a decision made by your senior subordinate even though you feel that you could have made a better one had you been in a position to do so.

The officer should ask for, listen to, and then carefully consider the merits of the recommendations of his senior noncom. If he then sees fit to reject the recommendation he should take the time to inform the NCO why.

The young officer will sometimes have to take determined action to hold the firm line of his authority and his position. The action will generally be in the form of a carefully considered verbal

rebuttal. This writer has known many lieutenants who have displayed unusual acumen in detecting a situation wherein a senior noncom is knowingly attempting to embarrass a young officer or cause him to suffer a loss of dignity or prestige. Some young officers seem to know exactly what words to use and what attitude to assume to handle the situation as quickly as it arises. Others may retire to consider a remedy and to reprimand and counsel the offender in private with a carefully considered plan of action. In any case, *action must be taken*. Failure to do so will cause a serious loss of respect and create a condition where our young officer will find it increasingly more difficult to maintain the dignity and position that the proper discharge of his duties require.

A senior noncom expects the officer partner to be conscientious about the unit or the section's general all around performance of duty. He also respects the officer who is loyal to the unit and furthermore expects his leader to express, by word and deed, a real feeling for the Marine Corps.

Much of the strain in the junior officer-senior noncom relationship is due to the lack of understanding and effort on the part of the latter. The following paragraphs will contain recommendations for the conduct of this junior partner that will make this relationship a strong element for good in the Marine Corps.

First, put yourself in the officer's position and consider his problems from that angle. Remember always that he is the responsible person. He answers for the success or failure of the section or unit to the next echelon. When there occurs a breakdown or a failure, you are not the person held responsible, the officer partner is the individual who stands on the mat and sweats out the blast. Remember also the disadvantages of his position. He must supervise and be responsible for the actions of Marines who have had years of experience. A thinking young officer, and our Marine Corps junior officers are almost without exception in this category, is constantly aware of the disadvantage that his lack of practical experience places him in. He has the authority and the backing of his lieutenant bars to pit against your years of experience and perhaps the prestige of an enviable reputation which is the result of years of outstanding service on your part. Yours is the practical advantage even though his is the legal advantage, a practical advantage is always apparent while a legal advantage is difficult to use and the wise junior officer will use it sparingly.

Secondly, do not resist the recommendations and ideas of the junior officer leader. Consider them on the basis of



their merit alone, and use them. Do not resist his leadership and supervision but rather use your years of experience and the prestige of your position to aid and abet his leadership effort.

Many young officers will develop improper techniques and will make mistakes in their conduct which will endanger their position and standing. This is where your tact comes in. There is always a tactful way to suggest a remedy for this situation if you will spend a little thought and time with the problem.

It should not be necessary to re-affirm this old axiom but apparently it is, because more and more we hear officers being criticized around the troops. *Do not criticize your officer in the presence of your troops.* In the 3 years I served as a private I can never remember hearing an NCO make a derogatory remark about an officer. Failure to observe this very basic rule of etiquette will have disastrous effects on your position as well as the officer's. *Do not violate it.*

Insist that all problems and recommendations of the members of the section or unit be canalized through you. Make it understood that you are the clearing house and that in the event you cannot make a decision you will take the problem to the officer in charge where you and he can consider the matter in private. Failure on your part to canalize the unit or section's business will cause for a condition where the officer in charge will become involved in trivia to an extent where he will not be free to work between you and the next echelon which is his proper function. Another result of failure in this aspect of your work is the fact that you will know less and less about what is going on to a point where your experience and practical know-how will have little effect on the functioning of the unit.

All senior noncoms know that they must set the example for their men, but it is well for them to remember that the junior officer is in many cases as much affected by their example as he is affected by the majors and captains with whom he comes in contact. If you show enthusiasm for the job and loyalty for the Marine Corps it is likely that he will do the same. Remember, esprit de corps is never out of date or out of place and if a widely respected senior noncom with 15 or 20 years of service intimates by word and deed that he considers his career well spent in the world's best military organization, the chances are good that both his juniors and his seniors will catch the same spirit and enthusiasm with the consequent betterment of the calibre of their work.

We all understand the condition wherein a senior noncom will have to work with and for the junior officer. We

also understand that the command link they form is important to the Marine Corps.

If both partners will observe the suggestions and recommendations listed above they will find their jobs easier and more gratifying, but, more important, many of the problems which now beset the Marine Corps will vanish and workings of the many small sections and units that make up the Marine Corps will more truly approach the ideal performance that we are all striving for.

MSgt C. V. Crumb, FMCR

## DISPLACED TECHNICIANS

MCAS, QUANTICO, VA. — "But I don't understand, Corporal. You stated you had just completed formal training in your MOS?"

"That's right, Gunny."

"Then why do you stand there looking so completely confused?"

"But, I have never seen this gear before. . .!"

And there you are—did the man dope off in school or did he just wander into the wrong line? Neither. The majority of the school trained Aviation Radio Technicians (Ground MOS 6621) who have been joined during the past 2 years have graduated in the top half; some even occupied the honor positions of their classes. All arrived at the unit designated on their orders. The truth, then, must simply be that they have not been exposed to the ground communications-electronics equipment installed at Marine Corps air stations, auxiliary air stations and air facilities.

The communications-electronics equipment that is installed for normal operations of an air station is predominantly Navy-type. It is procured by the Bureau of Ships with Bureau of Aeronautics' funds. Typical of this equipment are transmitters such as the AN/FRT-15, TED, AN/URT-7; receivers such as the AN/URR-13A and Hammerlund R-274B/URR. It may be true that some stations employ equipment "peculiar" to the Marine Corps, but these would constitute only a minute portion of the overall maintenance responsibilities of a communications department of an air station and would therefore warrant only proportionate attention. Herein lies the fallacy then of our training and placement system; the Marine Corps spends thousands of dollars instructing Marines on Marine Corps communications-electronics equipment only to do a "180" and transfer the same Marines to units employing predominately Navy-type equipment.

The purpose is defeated twofold; not only are many good instructional hours and dollars lost, but the unit to which

the man reports must take time to indoctrinate and re-instruct the man, via on-the-job training, in the operation and maintenance of equipment which is so different from that taught at the formal school.

The solution? One of two; either our Aviation (Ground) communications-electronics technician courses must instruct on the equipment-types "common" to the air stations and facilities, or, Marines must be assigned to Navy schools which offer instruction on Bureau of Ships procured ground communications-electronics equipment. For it is this type equipment that the 6621 will be required to know thoroughly and to be able to maintain competently upon his assignment to a Marine Corps Air Station.

A well placed Marine is a contented Marine and a well placed, contented Marine technician can mean high morale, a highly efficient air-ground communications system, enormous savings on time and dollars and last but, perhaps, the most important—increased reenlistments!

TSgt Edward W. Humphries

## ESPRIT de M O S: A HIDDEN DANGER

QUANTICO, VA.—The April 1957 issue of the GAZETTE contained an interesting and provocative article by Capt W. D. Chapman, which he called *Confessions Of A 2502*. It could be criticized, I suppose, on minor points. It indicts many for the mistakes of a few. It confuses a *Signal Annex to the Operation Order* with an *Operation Order of a Signal Unit*, neither of which, as a general rule, need be written on battalion level. And it suggests the idea that an understanding of communication systems in most Marine units is somewhat beyond the capability of the average Marine officer.

Perhaps *Confessions* has confused a symptom with a cause, and has attempted to deal with a small segment of a problem so broad that its full impact has been lost in the revolution of the military art which has developed in the past several decades.

Among our readers are many experienced, versatile officers. Some of them have commanded infantry units as well as communication units. They can tell you how much it means for a communicator to see a battalion commander inspect a \$508.00 AN/PRC-10 that 238 men depend upon, with the same care that he inspects a \$93.00 rifle that one man depends upon. They can offer expert advice on techniques and methods available to any commander in fulfilling his communication responsibilities.

But first, perhaps, we should question

our attitude. Captain Chapman has already skillfully questioned the attitude of a "2502," and let's hope that attitude is not universal. Now let us examine another attitude. It goes like this:

"I'm a line officer. The electronics personnel are here to handle the communication business, and they are technicians within their field. My MOS doesn't require me to get involved in specialist's work, and I don't want to hear about the megacycles and gobbledygook." Well, let's see.

1) *I'm a line officer*—The term "line officer" means many things to many people. If you want to see what "officer of the line" really means, as far as Marines are concerned, check Navy Regs. You'll find that the term includes, in the Marine Corps: An SDO; an LDO in the food services field; a warrant officer with an MOS in administration. Maybe you meant to say "unrestricted officer." That term would include officers with primary MOS 2502, Operational Communication Officer; it would *not* include a Limited Duty Officer in the infantry field.

2) *The electronics personnel are here to handle the communication business, and they are technicians within their field*—"Electronics" personnel, or technicians, are relatively few in our T/Os. In an infantry battalion, *one* enlisted with an MOS in "electronics" (Occupational Field 27) is authorized. The rest of the "communicators" we have are not in the "electronics" field, but in the "operational communications" field. In this occupational field, an enlisted man can be designated a "First Sergeant" or "Sergeant Major" by rank. If appointed to warrant officer grade, he is designated a "Marine Gunner." And if you find anything in the MOS manual that makes a 2502 a "technical specialist," outside of the first duty that's outlined there, then I've mis-read it. That first duty, though, does require at least some technical knowledge. It says: "Commands, or assists in commanding, a communication unit." You may have noticed the line in the T/O for the Communication Officer in H&S Co of an infantry battalion. Under Communication Platoon it says "Platoon Commander; Communication Officer." What's the difference, anyway? Responsibility is the difference, and we'll examine this with our next comment.

3) *My MOS doesn't require me to get involved in specialist's work, and I don't want to hear about the megacycles and gobbledygook*—If you hope some day to command or assist in commanding a combat or combat support unit with a staff, you may very well become "involved" in the work of people outside of the narrow limits which many see in an MOS.

There are two ends to every channel

of communication. In order to make the system work, both ends have to be operated effectively. The regimental communication platoon commander is responsible to the regimental commander for one end of the channel. He is also responsible for laying a wire line to the subordinate battalion command post. For installation and operation of the other end of the communication channel, the battalion commander is responsible to the regimental commander. He is responsible because there are many factors in the proper use of that wire line, switchboard or radio set, which only he has the power to control and over which only he can institute effective supervision.

Perhaps it would be good for our officers to understand the "branch" system the Army was using until recently. Did you know that the officer on the staff of an Army infantry division was a Signal Corps Officer, but that the CommO of an infantry regiment or battalion was an infantry officer (yes, he wore crossed rifles), with a communication MOS? In short, an MOS is not a corps, arm or service. We have *one* corps. It's the Marine Corps: Our FMFs are forces of combined arms. The MOS can be a useful device if properly used. If misunderstood, it can be dangerous! Of course, we have a Junior School and a Senior School, and you'll find a wide variety of MOSs enrolled in them. And it's interesting to note that our newly commissioned unrestricted officers—all of them, regardless of the MOSs they will later have—attend a Basic School which emphasizes infantry training. The Marine Corps Manual mentions that every officer is recognized as having a "field of command specialization." However, if we read more in Chapter 7 of Volume I, we'll get a broader picture of the designed system, and we'll see the intended objective. It is versatility, and the provision of well-rounded officers for command duty. The price is also there, but perhaps it's worth paying.

No, we're really not so specialized as some would have us believe. We can expect any officer, regardless of MOS, to rattle off "Browning Machine Gun, Caliber 30, M1919A4" at the drop of a hat. Why is it so terrible to expect him to know that an AN/MRC-38 is "line of sight," while an AN/GRC-9 is not?

I'd like to illustrate with a question. It shows how *Esprit de MOS* can affect our attitude on responsibility.

Look in the Rifle Company T/O for communication MOS (Occupational Fields 25, 26, 27). You don't find any. Now look at the billets, and you will see one that says "Messenger, Voice Radio Operator." There is *just* one, and his MOS is in the 03 field, infantry. There are 8 AN/PRC-6 radio sets in the

rifle company T/E, and one AN/PRC-10. My question is *who is responsible to the battalion commander for the operation of the rifle company station on the battalion tactical net?*

One rifle company commander I know (incidentally, with some communication training) told me he was, and didn't want any company radio operator assigned from the battalion communication platoon. Another friend of mine, a former rifle company commander in Korea, said that he expected a radio operator to be assigned to him from the battalion communication platoon; the CommO was "responsible" (and we're talking about responsibility now, and not staff supervision or staff cognizance). I must admit that a majority, but by no means all, of the communication officers I've spoken to, answer the question with either, "The CommO," or "What difference does it make?" I think most officers would answer "The CommO."

What's the answer? You won't find it, directly, in any book that I've been able to find. We do have certain doctrine, though, that's "in the book." A senior headquarters has responsibility for providing communications to its subordinate headquarters. The subordinate headquarters is responsible for proper operation of subordinate stations in the higher headquarters communication system. What's wrong with giving the responsibility for operation of his company station on the battalion tactical net to the rifle company commander? I'll tell you what some people find wrong with it: That radio operator is an "03!" The almighty MOS stares us right in the face. The company commander is an "03," too, and we'll have to have a "25" communicator down there—nobody seems to care if he's "assigned" or "attached"—from the battalion communication platoon, because the battalion CommO is a "25" officer, and he's "responsible for all communications." Presumably, the "25" radio operator has the skill to operate on a wide variety of voice equipments and on a wide variety of nets. The "03" radio operator has the skill, after some instruction, to operate an AN/PRC-10 on the battalion tactical net. But we'll send the "25" operator down because he's a brother-in-arms of the "25" officer. This, not withstanding Capt Chapman's comment "The CommO loses the capability of direct supervision simply because his empire is spread over several acres." The empire? Yes, the omnipotent MOS.

And what of the "03" officer? He's no electronics man—that's communications! It's not his MOS, you know, and he'll tell you so if you mention megacycles to him in public. He's no "specialist!"

Capt R. E. Kutz



## PRIZE ESSAY CONTEST

### CLASSIFICATIONS

**Group I: Field Grade Officers; Civilians**

**Group II: Company Grade Officers**

**Group III: Enlisted**

A total of \$1,500.00 will be awarded to the winners in the Marine Corps Association's 1957 Prize Essay Contest. Essays will be considered in three groups as above, determined by the status of the contestant as an active, inactive or retired member of the Armed Forces of the US and its Allies or as a civilian. A prize of \$500.00 will be awarded to the winner in each group. If, in the opinion of the Editorial Board, no essay entered in the contest is of sufficiently high standard of excellence, it is empowered not to award a prize in the class or classes concerned. Awards may be split among two or more entrants.

Material dealing with any facet of a new concept of warfare on ground or air operations or tactics is particularly desired. Historical monographs are not solicited unless they can point up some development or far-reaching thought that affects us directly today.

In addition to the prizes awarded, one or more essays may receive "Honorable Mention" and be accepted for publication. Even those not receiving a prize or honorable mention may be accepted for general publication in the GAZETTE. Compensation for such articles will be as adjudged by the Editorial Board.

### General Rules

1. Contestants may write on any subject of military interest but essays may not exceed 5,000 words and they must be original, as well as analytical or interpretive.
2. They must be typewritten, double-spaced, on paper approximately 8½ x 11, and must be submitted in triplicate—each copy complete in itself, legible and firmly bound.
3. The name of the competitor shall not appear on the essay. Each essay heading shall contain an identifying phrase consisting of the last 5 words of the essay, in addition to the article. This phrase shall appear:
  - a) On the title page of the essay.
  - b) On the outside of a sealed envelope containing the name (rank and serial number, if any) of the competitor.
  - c) Above the name and address of the competitor, inside the identifying envelope.
4. Essays and identifying envelope must be mailed in a large, sealed envelope marked Prize Essay Contest Group (I, II, III as appropriate) to the Secretary-Treasurer, Marine Corps Association, Box 1844, Quantico, Virginia.
5. Essays must be received by the Secretary-Treasurer prior to 1 October 1957.

The copyright of any essay which appears in the GAZETTE is the property of the Marine Corps Association. No liability for the loss, return, judging or reports on any essay submitted will be assumed by the Marine Corps Association or the GAZETTE and the decisions of the Editorial Board will be final. No inquiries regarding essays will be answered until after final judgment has been made.

### THE MARINE CORPS ASSOCIATION



# passing in review

## BOOKS OF INTEREST TO OUR READERS

### RAF at Sunset . . .

THE CENTRAL BLUE—Marshal of the RAF Sir John Slessor, GCB, DSO, MC—637 pages, photographs; Frederick A. Praeger, NY. \$7.50

There is alive today a generation of men who are unique in the history of warfare. They have seen a completely new and radical weapon—the piloted airplane—from infancy to deadly maturity; even, in the minds of some, to the threshold of obsolescence. Sir John Slessor is one of the men. He joined the Royal Air Force, then only 3 years old, in 1915. From 1950 until 1952 he served as Chief of the Air Staff—Britain's number one airman. His active service included command, staff and teaching assignments—all, apparently, in the right places and at the right time.

Slessor is an archetype of the British professional military man. He went to school at Haileybury, and never, in this book, fails to record his meetings with Old Haileyburians. In India he was obviously a *pukka sahib*—and a very thoughtful and dynamic planner. He feels the almost holy joy that comes to those who ride to hounds. Through all this, however, there emerges clearly a portrait of a hard-driving, capable and dedicated airman. The first 6 chapters, which the author thinks Americans ought to skip, are the means of learning what the man is really like.

As a chronicle, this book gives excellent accounts of air operations in World War I and of the interesting and little known events on the Northwest Frontier between wars. Slessor served as a planner on the Air Staff and his account of the errors and misapprehensions of the pre-World War II period are frank and full. He did a lot of work with this country prior to our entry into the war. He commanded Coastal Command during a critical period and was Eaker's deputy in the Mediterranean. He has seen a lot of war and reports it well.

Very early in his career, Slessor became interested in the higher direction of war. His work in this field and his account of it are most instructive. An American will sometimes be bemused and occasionally irritated by the Marshal's opinions—but he will also be instructed. One of the excellent appendices deals with "Command and Coordination When More Than One

Service is Concerned." It is an excellent exposition of the British view.

The Marshal's views on all matters of warfare are given freely, and with no excess modesty. At the time of the Casablanca conference, he was able to say, "... our experience of amphibious warfare and fighting Germans had left us with fewer delusions than our relatively inexperienced American friends. . . ." He is equally sure of himself in expounding his primitive tri-elemental view of organization—everything that flies goes in the Air Force, as any fool can plainly see. His destruction of the idea that a naval aviator must be a naval officer would have him summarily ejected from a freshman course in logic—but it satisfies him quite well.

It is evident that Slessor is less than completely attached to the Royal Navy. In a number of places he protests his great love and respect for the senior service, and then proceeds to very acid criticism of some Navy attitude or idea. His real disenchantment is saved, however, for the United States Navy. After warming up on Kelly Turner, he gets up to full temperature on the subject of Adm King. There was little he found to admire in this officer. Their differences over the Battle of the Atlantic were real and serious, but Slessor was



most disturbed by King's over-interest in the Pacific. In the light of the Casablanca agreement, the Marshal may have a case—but a Marine would find it hard to hate King on the evidence offered!

This book is an interesting—although understandably, sometimes biased—account of a professional life that has had its share of great deeds. It is possible to read, enjoy and profit from it without becoming fully convinced of the validity

of the author's convictions on a large range of subjects.

Reviewed by Col A. M. Fraser

ED: Col Fraser, presently on duty at HQMC, attended the British Joint Services Staff College, and served for 2 years as the CMC's representative at the British Amphibious Warfare School.

### December 7th . . .

DAY OF INFAMY—Walter Lord, 243 pages, photographs, maps, and index; Henry Holt & Co., N. Y., 1957. \$3.95

The great virtue of Walter Lord's Pearl Harbor account—*Day of Infamy*—lies in its power of evocation. Whether this would be so strong for readers who did not happen to have been at Pearl on 7 December 1941 is of course problematical, but the fact that Book-of-the-Month has tagged *Day of Infamy* would suggest that the book packs a punch. For me, it surely did.

*Day of Infamy* might well have been sub-titled, "The Human Side of Pearl Harbor." It is no detached analysis nor, for that matter, even an exhaustive operational picture of the most dramatic battle in American history. As a human picture of what people felt and did as individuals—of the personal impact of things personally seen or endured—the book must be unsurpassed. The intaglio which Mr. Lord inscribes, by minute strokes, adds up to the single, overpowering impression: "You are there!"

The focus of the book, as it should, falls on Pearl Harbor itself, primarily on Battleship Row (where USS *Arizona* rests to this day), but also on the opposite side of Ford Island (where the venerable *Utah* died of torpedoes intended for carriers), and on Ten-Ten Dock and the drydocks. Hickam, Wheeler Field, "Sheriff" Larkin's Marines at Ewa, and a lesser miscellany of places and impressions also get the coverage they deserve. So, for that matter, do the Japanese; those enigmatic little men who trounced us so thoroughly—this once—come up in most human, sometimes even engaging shapes.

Suspense is one of the author's most effective techniques. The book takes 67 pages before the first bomb drops. These 67 pages are painful, for they chronicle a death watch between 0600, when the

Japanese carrier planes took off, and 0755, when they struck. Here we read of the tragic but often too understandable overlooked tip-offs, the fumbles and delays: the destroyers finding and engaging midget submarines at the channel entrance (0640); the massive radar contacts (0702 and thereafter); the Army's stupidity in sending their final war alert message from Washington by "Routine" precedence because that saved money on commercial cable charges (the despatch, filed by Gen Marshall at 0631, Hawaiian time, was delivered to Fort Shafter at 1458). And the Army lieutenant — where is he now? — who shrugged off ("Don't worry about it . . .") the almost frantic report (0720) by Pvt Joseph Lockard that a large number of airplanes were headed for Oahu. This death watch, you realize in retrospect, was the death watch of the pre-war US Fleet and of quite a bit of the pre-war Services. "There are events in the story of nations," recently wrote Cecil Woodham-Smith, distinguished author of *The Reason Why*, "which cut their history in two. Nothing is ever the same again. On one side, lies the former world, lost, vanished, never to be restored — on the other a new and strange world, utterly unlike, perhaps to be lamented."

Such an event, in particular for the US Army, Navy and Marines, and in general for all Americans, was Pearl Harbor. And Walter Lord makes his reader know it.

The author's method, it strikes me, is mainly good reporting — which is a lot harder than it sounds. Mr. Lord seems to have made it his business to talk to a great many people who were present at Pearl during the attack to cross-check, to read daily papers of the time, and to pursue every lead with patience and unflagging curiosity.

Unfortunately for Marines, however, those who were at Pearl Harbor will feel that he omitted a very substantial part of the story — the immediate reaction of the several Marine defense battalions in the Navy Yard and at nearby Camp Catlin (3d, 4th and elements of the 1st and 2d Defense Battalions). I looked in vain, for example, for any notice of the 3d Defense's AA machine guns which went promptly and effectively into action from the Marine Barracks parade ground (and got one plane which crash-landed beside the Naval Hospital). Or of the 3-inch battery of the 4th Defense which got to the Navy Yard from Camp Catlin and into position before the second attack. Or of the truly heroic Marine on watch in the bowels of Drydock No. 1 who, in obedience to the 5th General Order, stuck to his post down below while the *Cassin* and *Downes*, exploding and aflame,

toppled into each other almost over his head. (Miraculously, he survived both fire and flood, and finally telephoned the guard-house that evening, wanting to know when they were going to send his relief.)

But obviously, in a story where every man's day was a distinct, unforgettable, uniquely personal drama, some few had to be left out. It is a pity, in this case, that Mr. Lord largely forgot (or overlooked) the doings of more than 2,000 Marines.

*Day of Infamy* seems otherwise refreshingly free of mistakes. About the most conspicuous that I could see was his consistent misnaming of the island of Kauai as "Kau." Also, wasn't the old Navy's renowned Chinese photographer Tai Sing Loo, not "Loe?" Finally, I very much question the statement (p. 150), which Mr. Lord recounts as unvarnished fact: "Staff Sergeant Chuck Murdaugh . . . grabbed a .30 caliber machine gun in his hands and fired away until he got a plane."

As to the book itself, *Day of Infamy* is vividly illustrated by a selection of photographs that make you shake your



head. The maps which comprise the end-pieces are clear, useful and ready to hand. The index is complete. In other words, a professional job of bookmaking which lives up to its ably prepared text.

One's final judgment after finishing the book — to the extent that its powerful evocations can be unwoven from independent memories — is this: Pearl Harbor may have been a catastrophe, but it was nothing to be ashamed of. In the words (which Mr. Lord does not quote) of the executive officer of the *West Virginia*, probably the hardest-hit ship that survived,

"Throughout the action, there was never the slightest sign of faltering or of cowardice. The actions of the officers and men were wholly commendable; their spirit was marvelous; there was no panic, no shirking nor flinching, and words fail in attempting to describe the

truly magnificent display of courage, discipline and devotion to duty of all."

Reviewed by Col R. D. Heinl, Jr.

Ed: Col Heinl commanded Battery F, 4th Defense Battalion, during the attack on Pearl Harbor.

## 70 Million Arabs Stirring . . .

THE IDEAS OF ARAB NATIONALISM—Hazem Zaki Nuseibeh; 216 pages; Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY. \$4.00

Here is an attempt to unscrew the inscrutable.

Our scholarly, moderate author seems to be the first to admit that the ideas of Arab nationalism — for all his painstaking scrutiny — are shrouded in doubt, conflict and misunderstanding. Arab nationalism, as dealt with by Dr. Nuseibeh, encompasses the "total experiences, aspirations and striving of nations — the motivations, the desires, the needs and the fears" of the 70 million Arab peoples from North Africa to the Levant to the Arabian Peninsula.

This nationalism, which he feels to be vital to the future of the Arabs, is the movement which will bring the Arab peoples abreast of modern Westernism after centuries of stagnation. It is the nationalism which aims at the unification of the Arabic speaking world under one political organization. The contrasting "nation-state" nationalism of the Arab countries arbitrarily placed on the map by the Western powers is something quite different and is far from desirable. In fact, he decries this nationalism as being the "chain or iron curtains" the realization of the Arab nationalists' goal. He protests the divide-and-rule policies of the mandate era when foreign powers sought to promote national (i.e. local) feeling. He charges that the education-to-self-rule under Western tutelage was indeed an obstacle to development and growth of political maturity; this harm far exceeding the undeniable benefits in the mechanics of administration.

Dr. Nuseibeh presents the factors of common language, historical tradition and identity of interest as contributing to Arab nationalism; he discards the often mentioned factors of race and religion. He suggests that religious zeal, national patriotism, suspicion of foreigners, economic grievances and the urge to revolt are motivations to mass action but are not rightly ascribed to nationalism. He feels that the term "Arab" in Arab nationalism stands for a political concept and has no social or ethnic significance.

The genesis of Arab nationalism is dealt with in the opening chapters covering the pre-Islamic, the Islamic and



## NEW BOOKS

The books listed below have been received recently by the GAZETTE for review. More detailed reviews of many of these books will appear in subsequent issues. These books may be purchased at the GAZETTE BOOKSHOP now. Association members who are interested in reviewing books should notify the Editor and Publisher.

### GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, SHIELD OF THE UNION—

Warren W. Hassler, Jr. LSU Press, Baton Rouge, La. \$6.00

In this study based on much new material and a complete re-examination of all original sources, the author penetrates the fog of misunderstanding that has surrounded McClellan's motives for so many years and restores him to his just status as a great general.

### THE BRIDGE AT ANDAU—James Michener. Random House, NY. \$3.50

There was a bridge at Andau, Hungary, near the Austrian border, and if a Hungarian reached it he was nearly free. James A. Michener was at that bridge and helped many Hungarians across. From what these victims of Russian bestiality told him, he has drawn a picture of Hungary under Russian domination, up through the final terror of the rape of Budapest and its aftermath.

### MERMAIDS AND MASTODONS—Richard Carrington. Rinehart, NY. \$3.95

Mermaids and mastodons are only two out of a host of unusual, romantic and mythological creatures described and pictured in this book. It is a natural and unnatural history which covers nonexistent creatures, unbelievable monsters, animals recently extinct and living fossils. The text and pictures are divided into 4 sections: Behind the Legends; The Stone Testament; Living Links with the Past; The Death of Races.

### TRUXTUN OF THE CONSTELLATION—Eugene S. Ferguson. Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore. \$5.25

Thomas Truxtun was one of the first 6 captains appointed to the United States Navy by President Washington in 1794. His great moment came when he was chosen to be captain of the frigate *Constellation*. Truxtun family papers never before available to historians were used in the preparation of this portrait.

### NINE WHO SURVIVED HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI—Robert Trumbull. E. P. Dutton, NY. \$2.95

This is subtitled, personal experiences of nine men who lived through both atomic bombings. It is the tremendous story of nine Japanese who survived the atom bomb at Hiroshima and fled to Nagasaki for safety, only to undergo the same experience again.

the modern periods. The author later discusses the Arab political thinking of the periods 1800 to WWI, between the Wars and post WWII, largely by interpreting the thought of Arab theorists of these periods. Valuable final chapters are concerned with social change and the determinants of social change in the Arab world. Interspersed with the above are chapters on national ideology in the comparative sense, the factors of Arab nationalism and the antecedents of Arab political thought: It is in these chapters that the author overwhelms his subject with an onslaught of social-political science. An appendix: Approaches to the Study of Nationalism, if read first, is helpful in getting the reader off on the right (nonmilitary of course) foot.

Hazim Zaki, PhD (political science, Princeton) is a Jordanian, now Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Reconstruction and Development. He has been a member of Jordan's delegation to the Jordan-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission and represented Jordan on the Advisory Council of the UN Relief and Works Agency.

Reviewed by LtCol E. C. Atkin, Jr.  
Ed: This reviewer is an instructor at Junior School, MCS.

### A Forfeited Victory . . .

GRAF SPEE: The Life and Death of a Raider—Dudley Pope; 256 pages; J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia and NY. \$3.95

DEATH IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, The Last Voyage of the Graf Spee—Michael Powell; 247 pages; Rinehart & Company, Inc., NY. \$3.95

In the early morning hours of 13 December 1939, 3 British cruisers established contact with the German pocket battleship *Graf Spee*. For the number of ships engaged the ensuing battle was probably followed more avidly than any subsequent naval engagement of WWII.

The battle was the Battle of the River Plate, taking its name from that broad estuary off which the running engagement occurred and whose shallow waters ultimately became the final resting place of the *Graf Spee*. The 3 British ships were the heavy cruiser HMS *Exeter*, an 8-inch gun "Treaty" ship, and the light cruisers HMS *Ajax* and HMS *Achilles*, both mounting 6-inch main batteries—hardly a match for the 11-inch broadsides of *Graf Spee*. The cruiser force, nevertheless, hoisted battle flags at fore and main and attacked with a dogged determination that earned them the admiration of the world. The price for British valor was high, with *Exeter* hammered into impotence and barely under control, limping off for the

Falklands, and *Ajax*, sorely hit, replying with but half of her main battery.

Once the price was paid, however, the reward for determination and perseverance was forthcoming. *Graf Spee*, herself not undamaged, broke off the action and ran for the safety provided by the neutral waters of the River Plate. For the British, by now lying in wait off the estuary, victory came in an unexpected way. The Uruguayan Government had ruled that the *Graf Spee* must sail at the end of 72 hours or suffer internment. Rather than risk possible capture in battle with the British or permit the threatened internment by Uruguay, the decision was made to scuttle. Thus, at sunset on 17 December 1939, ended the life of a celebrated ship in the shallow waters of the Plate estuary and, a few days later, by suicide, the life of her Captain.

This is the historic naval battle about which both Dudley Pope and Michael Powell have written. But each has treated the incident differently.

Mr. Pope, newspaperman, naval historian, wartime merchant sailor, has written in *Graf Spee: The Life and Death of a Raider* the factual account of the battle, based on exhaustive studies of British and German naval records and personal interviews of the participants. Concerned with historical exactness, but not overlooking the natural drama of the engagement, he probes for answers to the questions that have remained unanswered across the years. Why did *Graf Spee* break off the action and run when victory was but a matter of a few more salvos? Why did Captain Langsdorff choose the risk of internment and the odds of being cornered in the Plate when the gambler's chances lay on the broad reaches of the high seas? And what about the scuttling of *Graf Spee* and Langsdorff's suicide?

*Death in the South Atlantic*, on the other hand, is the story teller's account of the battle—an "adventure-story," in the words of the author. Michael Powell became absorbed in the story when he started collecting material for the motion picture "Pursuit of the *Graf Spee*" which he wrote and co-produced with Emeric Pressburger. *Death in the South Atlantic* is, consequently, a narrative replete with dialogue, fast moving and readable. But though his account is based in fact, Mr. Powell tells us in his foreword that he has "felt free to reject, adapt and invent" for the sake of the story. Consequently, the reader who is familiar with the facts or who reads both accounts will discern some minor liberties with historical incident. Happily, the account of the battle itself is not a victim.

Both books accomplish their assigned



goals admirably. Mr. Pope's careful work deserves a place on the bookshelves of naval history while Mr. Powell's finds its niche among the ever-appealing narratives of the sea.

Reviewed by Maj J. M. Sherwood

Ed: Long interested in naval affairs, Maj Sherwood has recently been assigned to Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, Sandia, NM.

### Of the Royal Marines . . .

ONE MARINE'S TALE—Gen Sir Leslie Hollis. 182 pages, index, illustrations. Andre Deutsch, London. \$2.10

Gen Hollis' name crops up continually in the memoirs of the top military and political leaders of WW II. As personal staff officer to Churchill and Secretary to the British Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee, he was a behind-the-scenes participant in most of the important inter-Allied conferences and saw the war through in the rarefied atmosphere of global strategy. His book is far from Olympian in character, however, and consists mainly of simple, readable highlights of the span of events and people he encountered.

For 13 eventful years "Jo" Hollis was seconded from the Royal Marines to staff work in Britain's defense ministry. His tour of duty stretched from the lean budget days of the '30s when bitter and familiar interservice rivalries smoldered with roots in "differences about the functions and potentialities of an air force in modern war," to the even more worrisome days of atomic war considerations. By far the greatest part of the book is devoted to this significant period.

Gen Hollis gives us just a summary glimpse of his life as a junior and field officer in the Royal Marines. Perhaps he or his publisher thought that there would be no readers for a book that detailed the experiences of a Marine in the period between the World Wars. Certainly this is not the case with a book written as well as this one. Far too little has been set down of the history of the Royal Marines, and there was missed opportunity here to fill in many of the gaps. This is especially true for the two brief chapters that cover Sir Leslie's term as Commandant General (1948-1952).

Hollis' observations on his official visit here in 1951 will interest many who met him then. He recognized that "to be an American Marine is a 'religion'" —a 'religion' obviously shared by members of Her Majesty's Royal Marines. As he notes with dry humor, a "small" parade of 14,000 men turned out in his honor at San Diego mustered "substantially more than the entire strength of the Royal Marines." However, neither he nor his reader questions the fact that the close ties between the two corps are

not based on relative strength but on a firm basis of mutual respect.

Gen Shepherd has written an introduction to these memoirs which commends the book to all US Marines who recall with pride their close association the 41 Commando at Chosin. Little can be added to that sentiment.

Reviewed by H. I. Shaw, Jr.

Ed.: Mr. Shaw, a historian with G3, HQMC, served with the Marine Corps in WW II and Korea.

### Singular Adventure . . .

SAILING ALONE AROUND THE WORLD—Capt Joshua Slocum, 320 pages. New York: Dover Publications, Inc. \$1.00

By the mere assertion of an "expert" that it could not be done, Joshua Slocum had to do it. On the tiny craft *Spray* the author established an epic "first" in history—never before had any craft circumnavigated the globe with a one-man crew.

Written with literary cunning at a pace almost as swift as the *Spray* herself, Slocum presents many amusing incidents of the voyage with a casualness that is deceiving. The voyage by Slocum, which ended 27 June 1898, took 3 years and two months, with two days over coming up. Slocum, the storyteller, takes his readers along the entire voyage in a matter of a few hours.

Capt Slocum colorfully describes his voyage with incidents that make the average landlubber want to believe the "expert" who said it could not be done. An encounter with Black Pedro (a murderer), a savage from the islands who wanted the *Spray*, and on the defensive against a fleet of hostile canoes are described by Slocum with an air of casualness and wit.

An exhilarating sea classic, *Sailing Alone Around the World* is a very delightful account of the voyage down the Atlantic, around the Cape, through the Strait of Gibraltar, on a true course with the rudder lashed, as much as 30 hours at a stretch at the wheel, and thousands of miles up the Indian Ocean, and the tempestuous Southern (misnamed Pacific, claims Slocum).

With imagination and a sense for color, the author says he was aided by the Pilot of the *Pinta* (one of Columbus' ships), and believed in luck, his skill, and guidance of The Great Navigator above.

The Captain's luck ran out in 1909. Setting sail with the *Spray* . . . she was never heard from again . . . somewhere on the high seas . . .

Reviewed by MSgt F. R. Babcock

Ed: As a seagoing Marine, this reviewer has visited all the ports and sailed the seas mentioned in this book.

DEATH OF A NAVY—Andrieu d'Albas. Devin-Adair, NY. \$5.50

The battle story of the Imperial Japanese Navy from a few days prior to Pearl Harbor to the surrender. It is based on Japanese documents, conversations with ranking Japanese officers and on reminiscences of Japanese seamen. The author is a reserve captain in the French Navy, and is married to a Japanese. RAdm Robert A. Theobald, USN (Ret), wrote the introduction and has interspersed the account with his notes.

HIGH SPEED FLIGHT—E. Ower and J. Naylor. Philosophical Library, NY. \$10.00

This book describes the special problems of high-speed and supersonic flight and contains information not hitherto released for general publication. The fundamentals of flight are first explained, followed by an account of the inauguration of a new era by the breaking of the sound barrier. The physiological problems of high-speed flight are also reviewed. The volume was printed in Great Britain.

HISTORY OF GERMANY—Minna R. Falk. Philosophical Library, NY. \$6.00

In a division of space covering 4 centuries of German history, this volume emphasizes material essential to an understanding of modern Germany. It includes a full discussion of the present government of the Federal Republic and the situation in eastern Germany, and concludes with a summary of Germany's as yet unsolved problems.

GLOBAL STRATEGY—E. J. Kingston McCloughry. Frederick A. Praeger, NY. \$4.50

After a review of the evolution of war and the transition from classical to modern strategy, the author discusses the military aspects of the world's geographical zones and defines their relative strategic importance. He advocates principles and a methodology of solving Allied strategic problems and conflicts to make the West master of the strategic situation.

HOLOCAUST AT SEA—Corvette Captain Fritz-Otto Busch. Rinehart, NY. \$3.50

Subtitled "The Drama of the *Scharnhorst*," this volume tells the story of the pride of the German Navy. In 1942 when the ship escaped from Brest two British task forces were sent to intercept her. One of them made contact and the result was a holocaust in which the *Scharnhorst* took 56 torpedoes before going down.

# BOOKS ON PARADE

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